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A N I T A  S .  K R I S H N A K U M A R  
How Long Is History’s Shadow? 
Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation 
of Powers 
B Y  J O S H  C H A F E T Z  
Y A L E  U N I V E R S I T Y  P R E S S ,  2 0 1 7  
abstract.  In Congress’s Constitution, Josh Chafetz takes issue with those who have questioned 
the value of Congress in recent years. He argues that Congress’s critics focus too heavily on its 
legislative function and ignore several important nonlegislative powers that enable Congress to ex-
ert signiﬁcant authority vis-à-vis the other branches. Chafetz engages in close historical examina-
tion of these nonlegislative powers and notes that in some cases, Congress has ceased exercising 
them as robustly as it once did, while in others it has unwittingly ceded them to another branch. 
Congress’s Constitution urges Congress to reassert several of its ceded powers more aggressively go-
ing forward, in order to recapture some of the authority and inﬂuence it has lost over time. 
 While admiring Chafetz’s project—and sharing in his nostalgia for some of Congress’s lost 
powers—this Review questions Congress’s ability and inclination to rehabilitate its underused 
powers in the manner Chafetz advocates. It argues, ﬁrst, that at least some of the powers Chafetz 
seeks to revive read like ancient history—the record of an era of legislative governance that has 
long since passed and that subsequent political and legal events have transformed—perhaps irre-
versibly. Second, it notes that Chafetz may be underestimating some important dynamics, such as 
partisanship, that could make Congress itself less likely to want to exercise its powers, and the public 
unlikely to accept Congress’s attempts to aggressively exercise powers that have lain dormant for 
decades. More fundamentally, the Review suggests that the present-day Congress may be too 
shortsighted to look past what it “wants in the moment” in order to take steps that will beneﬁt it 
as an institution. Moreover, Congress may not care as much about preserving its own traditions 
and history as Chafetz does. 
 In the end, the Review therefore submits that while reinvigorating Congress’s underappreci-
ated powers is a good idea in theory, in practice it may prove more challenging than Chafetz rec-
ognizes. 
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introduction 
Josh Chafetz’s Congress’s Constitution opens with the observation that it is, 
and long has been, in vogue to question the value of Congress—calling it dys-
functional, “the broken branch,” lamenting its seeming inability to make law.
1
 
Chafetz quickly takes issue with such criticisms, arguing that they focus nar-
rowly on Congress’s power to legislate and ignore numerous nonlegislative pow-
ers that the Constitution confers on the ﬁrst branch. The book’s project is to 
illuminate these other, nonlegislative powers—which Chafetz argues have been 
underappreciated by scholars and commentators—and to demonstrate how such 
powers give Congress signiﬁcant ability to “assert itself vigorously” against the 
other branches.
2
 Chafetz’s approach is historical and rich in political context. He 
urges that if we examine Congress’s nonlegislative powers historically, we will 
see that Congress (as well as the British Parliament and colonial assemblies be-
fore it) has, through a combination of design and judicious execution, served as 
a powerful counterweight to the other branches on numerous occasions. More-
over, the history reveals that over the years, Congress has unwisely ceded to the 
other branches many powers that it once exercised vigorously. 
Congress’s Constitution is more, however, than just a reference guide for the 
origins and historical evolution of Congress’s nonlegislative powers. Its central 
thesis is that Congress should more forcefully rehabilitate and exercise its non-
legislative powers. Chafetz makes the case that it is in Congress’s best interests 
as a coequal branch to revitalize these powers—that doing so would enhance 
Congress’s legitimacy with the public, and that it is consistent with the constitu-
tional design for Congress to assert itself more robustly against the other 
branches. Ultimately, Chafetz posits that whether Congress can successfully re-
capture its ceded powers will depend on its ability to persuade the public to its 
side.
3
 He contends that the tools given to Congress in the Constitution merely 
set the stage, forming the basis for making Congress’s case to the public, and 
that it is public support that ultimately determines whether Congress can suc-
cessfully check the executive or judicial branches.
4
 
Congress’s Constitution is an impressive and important book. It provides per-
haps the most authoritative account to date of how the constitutional powers of 
the legislative branch developed—as well as the effective and ineffective use of 
those powers, their contemporary constitutional status, and the most signiﬁcant 
 
1. JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 1 (2017). 
2. Id. at 2. 
3. See id. at 14. 
4. See id. at 14, 20-21. 
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interpretive questions that remain open for constitutional debate. I have great 
admiration for Chafetz’s historical analysis and his bold, optimistic vision of con-
gressional power. Like Chafetz, I am a supporter of Congress and am predis-
posed to see virtue in its ability to act as a meaningful counterweight to the Pres-
ident and the courts. And I am perhaps peculiarly fascinated by Congress’s 
arcane procedures, history, and rules, as manifested by my own earlier work on 
congressional procedure.
5
 
But once Chafetz moves beyond the historical account, I harbor some skep-
ticism about both his speciﬁc recommendations and Congress’s ability to reclaim 
or rehabilitate its powers in the manner he advocates. I also part company, reluc-
tantly, with Chafetz’s idealistic faith in Congress to rise to the occasion and re-
claim its rightful authority. I foresee at least three potential obstacles: (1) some 
of the powers Chafetz describes read like ancient history—the record of an era of 
legislative governance that has long since passed and that subsequent political 
events have transformed, perhaps irreversibly; (2) Chafetz ignores or undersells 
important dynamics, such as partisanship, that may make Congress itself less 
likely to want to exercise its dormant powers and the public less likely to accept 
modern congressional attempts to aggressively exercise those powers; and (3) 
Congress as an institution may not have the integrity or farsightedness to look 
past what it “wants in the moment”
6
 and consider what will beneﬁt it as an in-
stitution. Indeed, Congress may not care as much as Chafetz or other academics 
do about preserving its own traditions and history. 
This Review proceeds in two Parts. Part I is descriptive: it outlines several of 
the underappreciated nonlegislative powers that Congress’s Constitution examines 
and notes Chafetz’s recommendations for how Congress should reinvigorate 
them going forward. Part II then argues that some of the powers Chafetz recom-
mends reinvigorating may be difficult to revive as a practical matter, and that 
some should not be revived even if it would be practically feasible to do so. Spe-
ciﬁcally, Part II notes that historical developments—including changes to the 
congressional budget process, the professionalization of the civil service, and 
power grabs by other branches—have dramatically altered the political land-
scape.
7
 It may be too late, and in some cases undesirable, for Congress to exercise 
 
5. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a Legis-
lative Process Problem, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2009); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Mad-
isonian, Interest-Group-Based Approach to Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513 (2007); Anita 
S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135 (2005) [here-
inafter Krishnakumar, Debt Limit]; Anita S. Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal 
Constitution: The Anatomy of the 1995-96 Budget Train Wreck, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589 (1998) 
[hereinafter Krishnakumar, Reconciliation]. 
6. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 302. 
7. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
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its latent powers in the manner of Parliament versus the Stuart Crown, or colo-
nial assemblies, or even Congress itself during Reconstruction. Part II also con-
siders how partisanship, the polarization of the voting public, and congressional 
shortsightedness may impact both Congress’s willingness to exercise some of its 
powers robustly and the public’s perception of Congress if it chooses to do so. 
i .  underappreciated congressional powers 
This Part provides an overview of the institutional resources and nonlegisla-
tive powers that Congress’s Constitution argues the legislature can and should use 
to exercise substantial inﬂuence over the other branches. Chafetz’s underlying 
theme is that Congress has ceded its constitutional authority to the other 
branches and should recapture that authority by revitalizing its nonlegislative 
powers and being more “judicious” in its use of them.
8
 Section A discusses non-
legislative congressional powers that historically have been used to check the ex-
ecutive branch. Section B explores powers that Congress has ceded to the judi-
ciary or, perhaps more accurately, that the judiciary has seized from Congress in 
cases that can be viewed as modern-day Marbury v. Madisons—in that they wrest 
power from the political branches for the judiciary.
9
 
A. Checking the Executive 
This Section summarizes how Congress’s Constitution treats three underap-
preciated powers that serve as a check on the executive branch: the power of the 
purse, the freedom of speech or debate (and speciﬁcally the freedom to leak clas-
siﬁed information), and the personnel power. A fourth power that has tradition-
ally served as a check on the executive branch, the power to punish contempts, 
 
8. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 6. 
9. All of the powers examined in Congress’s Constitution are summarized in this Part, save one: 
the authority given to each house to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 5, cl. 2. This power, which Chafetz refers to as “cameral rules,” is omitted because 
Congress’s Constitution neither suggests that Congress has let this power fall into disuse nor 
makes any recommendation that Congress rehabilitate it. Rather, Chafetz observes, based on 
historical examples, that Congress can use its authority to determine its own internal rules 
either to strengthen its institutional capacity or to diminish it, arguing that the latter occurs 
when Congress deploys its internal rules in a manner that obstructs legislative action, allow-
ing the other branches to paint Congress as irresponsible or dysfunctional. Chafetz urges 
Congress to steer clear of such obstructionist uses of its cameral rules. See CHAFETZ, supra note 
1, at 300-01. Because Chafetz makes no concrete recommendations that Congress reinvigorate 
its authority to determine its internal rules in the future but merely cautions Congress to be 
judicious in its use of this power, this Review does not address the plausibility or desirability 
of Congress following his suggestions. 
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is discussed in Section B because it is also a power that Congress has ceded to 
the judicial branch. Section B also examines Congress’s internal discipline power, 
which likewise has been ceded to the judiciary. As Congress’s Constitution reveals, 
Congress and its predecessors have vigorously deployed each of the powers dis-
cussed in this Section at various points in Anglo-American history. This Section 
both reviews the history provided in Congress’s Constitution and discusses 
whether Congress has allowed the power at issue to fall into disuse or has con-
tinued to exercise it in recent years. In the former cases, Congress’s Constitution 
tends to recommend that Congress reassert the underused power in the manner 
formerly employed; in the latter cases, it recommends new applications of the 
power to counteract the executive branch. 
1. The Power of the Purse 
Chafetz begins with the observation that although Congress’s exercise of the 
power of the purse requires legislative action, appropriations laws differ from 
other legislation because their annual passage “is necessary to the continued 
functioning of the entire government” and this “guarantees that, every year, each 
house of Congress has the opportunity to give meaningful voice to its priorities 
and its discontentments.”
10
 I would characterize the appropriations power as a 
superlegislative power, or one that is not subject to the legislative roadblocks that 
often derail other legislation, rather than group it together with Congress’s non-
legislative powers as Chafetz does. But I take Chafetz’s underlying point to be 
that the appropriations power provides Congress with unique and underappre-
ciated opportunities, not present in the ordinary legislative process, to assert it-
self and to check the other branches. Chafetz focuses on three forms of the ap-
propriations power that Congress historically has used to its advantage: (1) 
speciﬁc appropriations, including riders; (2) zeroing out government officials’ 
salaries to express displeasure with executive policies; and (3) government shut-
downs. As with all of the powers examined in Congress’s Constitution, he argues 
that Congress has underutilized these powers, that scholars have underestimated 
their efficacy, or both. 
Annual legislative appropriations originated in the British Parliament and 
were tied closely to speciﬁc expenditures.
11
 In acts analogous to modern appro-
priations riders, legislatures beginning in the late Middle Ages not only appro-
priated funds, but also speciﬁed how the money was to be spent—even going so 
 
10. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 45. 
11. See id. at 51. 
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far as to ban the use of appropriated funds for other unspeciﬁed purposes.
12
 
Thus, for example, an appropriation to King Charles II during wartime con-
tained the following speciﬁc limitation: “[T]hirty thousand pounds and noe 
more of the money to be raised by this Act may be applied for the payment of 
His Majesties Guards.”
13
 Colonial assemblies in the 1600s continued this strong 
assertion of legislative authority over appropriations, even withholding funds 
when they did not approve of the way the royal government was spending 
them.
14
 Indeed, Chafetz notes, “‘foot-dragging on appropriations and other bills 
became a favored tactic in the burgesses’ struggles’ with royal governors in Vir-
ginia”—including petty refusals to appropriate funds for the customary annual 
celebrations of the King’s birthday, accession, and coronation.
15
 
By the 1700s, the assemblies were withholding appropriations not just to ex-
press disagreement with policies, but also to punish crown-appointed officials 
in their personal capacities by “zeroing out”—i.e., refusing to pay—their salaries. 
Congress’s Constitution describes in colorful detail how the Massachusetts Assem-
bly, for example, postponed the semiannual appropriation for the Governor’s 
salary until the end of the session and then reduced it by one hundred pounds to 
add insult to injury.
16
 Similarly, when the commanding officer of the royal army 
in the colony would not follow the Assembly’s orders, it refused to vote him his 
pay and “compelled his discharge.”
17
 In the same vein, the South Carolina House 
of Commons refused to appropriate any salary at all for the crown-appointed 
Chief Justice because he sided with the royally appointed Governor in a dispute 
with the legislature.
18
 
Chafetz draws bold conclusions from this history. Speciﬁcally, he notes that 
although the U.S. Constitution protects presidential salaries from alteration dur-
ing the President’s term, judicial salaries from diminishment, and congressional 
 
12. See id. at 46. 
13. Id. at 48 (alteration in original) (quoting Taxation Act 1666, 18 & 19 Car. 2 c. 1, § 31 (Eng.)). 
14. See id. at 54. 
15. Id. (quoting WARREN M. BILLINGS, A LITTLE PARLIAMENT: THE VIRGINIA ASSEMBLY IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 183 (2004)). 
16. Id. Chafetz reports that the ultimate grant to the Lieutenant Governor was so small in amount 
that he returned it “in disgust.” Id. (quoting 3 HERBERT L. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES 
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 156-57 (1958)). 
17. Id. (quoting EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR IN THE ENGLISH COLO-
NIES OF NORTH AMERICA 191-92 (Russell & Russell 1966) (1898)). 
18. Id. (citing 3 HERBERT L. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 123 
(1958)). 
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salaries from “varying” until after the next election,
19
 “it does not otherwise pre-
vent officers’ salaries from being reduced.”
20
 Chafetz argues that based on this 
omission, combined with the history and an understanding that the allocation 
of powers between the branches is constantly being recalibrated through consti-
tutional politics, we should view Congress’s authority to “zero out” speciﬁc pro-
grams or officials’ salaries as “simply another one of the tools by which Congress 
can press for decision-making authority in substantive areas.”
21
 In other words, 
Chafetz advocates that the present-day Congress should rehabilitate the power 
to zero out salaries as a mechanism to express disapproval of executive branch 
officials. 
Congress’s Constitution also discusses Congress’s historical use of riders, at-
tached to must-pass appropriations bills, that seek to force the executive to ac-
cept policies (or limitations) important to Congress. Chafetz’s examples are spo-
radic, ranging from an 1810 proviso requiring that certain diplomatic officials be 
conﬁrmed by the Senate in order to receive their salary (even though no sub-
stantive legislation mandated such conﬁrmation)
22
 to post-Reconstruction rid-
ers seeking to repeal laws that protected voting rights.
23
 Based on this history, 
Chafetz argues that the present-day Congress should employ appropriations rid-
ers aggressively, as leverage to force policy concessions that are important to it.
24
 
Finally, Congress’s Constitution embraces Congress’s power to shut down the 
federal government. Chafetz notes that the federal government has shut down 
eighteen times since 1976—including two memorable and lengthy shutdowns in 
1995 and 1996.
25
 He argues that despite the fact that Congress “was the clear 
institutional loser” in the infamous 1995-96 shutdowns, it is a mistake to infer 
that Congress will inevitably lose in all shutdowns.
26
 Rather, in his view, such 
shutdowns present both opportunities and dangers for Congress. For example, 
Chafetz points to the 2011 showdown between President Obama and the Repub-
lican-controlled Congress as a victory for Congress, arguing that the credible 
threat of a shutdown enabled the House leadership to bargain for and obtain a 
great deal of what it wanted policy-wise, as well as to maintain, and perhaps 
 
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (presidential salaries); id. art. III, § 1 (judicial salaries); id. 
amend. XXVII (congressional salaries). 
20. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 56. 
21. Id. at 67. 
22. Id. (citing Act of May 1, 1810, ch. 44, § 2, 2 Stat. 608, 608). 
23. See id. at 68. 
24. See id. at 71-72. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 68-69. 
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enhance, its institutional power.
27
 Who ultimately wins in these budget battles, 
Chafetz maintains, depends on the “artfulness with which political actors exer-
cise the power that they do have.”
28
 
In Part II, I question a number of Chafetz’s suggestions urging Congress to 
more aggressively deploy the power of the purse. For example, I observe that 
modern historical developments, including the rise of the civil service, may have 
moved public opinion to a point where the “zeroing out” of salaries is no longer 
a feasible or legitimate congressional move.
29
 Moreover, a colonial legislature’s 
refusal to pay the salary of officers appointed by an external sovereign, who 
lacked support or an electoral connection with the American public, seems qual-
itatively different from a present-day Congress’s refusal to pay the salary of ex-
ecutive branch officials appointed by a President who has a meaningful electoral 
connection to every state’s voters. In addition, the “underutilization” of the ap-
propriations power that Chafetz complains of is the result of numerous struc-
tural changes that Congress (and in some cases the President) made over time 
to the annual budget process—often without appreciating the effect that these 
cumulative changes would have on Congress’s power to check the executive 
branch.
30
 For example, in 1917, Congress enacted the Second Liberty Bond Act, 
which delegates standing authority to the Treasury Secretary to borrow funds 
without seeking congressional approval, up to a maximum debt limit established 
by Congress.
31
 While the debt limit statute requires the Secretary to periodically 
ask Congress for additional borrowing authority, it eliminates the need for the 
executive branch to request congressional approval for every speciﬁc instance of 
borrowing—and thus constitutes a substantial cession of power to the executive. 
Further, during the 1960s, Congress created several entitlement programs, such 
as Social Security and Medicare, which establish automatic rights to public funds 
for citizens who meet statutory requirements.
32
 These automatic payments, 
combined with interest payments owed on the national debt, account for over 
two-thirds of annual government spending, effectively taking two-thirds of the 
 
27. Id. at 69-70. 
28. Id. at 71. 
29. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
30. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 45. 
31. Second Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 65-43, § 1, 40 Stat. 288, 288 (1917) (codiﬁed as amended 
at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012)). 
32. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 57 (3d ed. 2007) (ex-
plaining that direct spending for Social Security and Medicare beneﬁts “is not controlled by 
annual appropriations but by the legislation that establishes eligibility criteria and payment 
formulas, or otherwise obligates the government”). 
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annual budget out of Congress’s hands.
33
 Congress also enacted the Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921, which directs the President to initiate the annual appro-
priations process by submitting a draft budget to Congress.
34
 This practice gives 
the President the “ﬁrst-mover” advantage and forces Congress to react to the 
President’s proposals.
35
 Thus, the erosion of Congress’s power of the purse has 
been caused, not by a single or simple act of executive branch usurpation or even 
by simple congressional disuse, but rather by numerous structural changes that 
combine to limit the scope of Congress’s discretion over appropriations. Many 
of these structural changes were designed to streamline or centralize the appro-
priations process because Congress’s piecemeal approach to budgeting had 
proved unwieldy and inadequate to meet the needs of an expanding American 
state. None seems to have been designed with the purpose of enhancing Con-
gress’s institutional standing—or, indeed, shows any sign that its drafters even 
paid attention to the impact that a particular change would have on Congress’s 
appropriations power. 
Last, I ﬁnd Chafetz’s take on government shutdowns both intriguing and 
troublesome. As someone who has written extensively on the congressional 
budget process and the 1995-96 shutdowns in particular, I confess that I am 
among those who have tended to view government shutdowns as harmful to 
Congress, because they make it look petty.
36
 But Chafetz may be right that schol-
ars and commentators have been too quick to conclude that Congress always 
 
33. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 105TH CONG., THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PRO-
CESS: AN EXPLANATION 5-6, 56 (Comm. Print 1998); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET 
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 120 tbl.S-4 (2016) (projecting total spending 
of ﬁscal year 2017 to be $4.089 trillion, of which $2.878 trillion would go to mandatory spend-
ing and net interest); Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto Act, 35 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 314 (1998) (noting the considerable growth in mandatory spending 
since the 1960s); Alan L. Feld, The Shrunken Power of the Purse, 89 B.U. L. REV. 487, 492 
(2009) (noting that the prevalence of “permanent ﬁscal legislation limits Congress’s ability to 
review and change priorities through the appropriation process”). 
34. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, §§ 207-217, 42 Stat. 20, 22-23. 
35. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 573, 589 (2008) (noting the “ﬁrst-mover advantage [that] . . . accrues from the Presi-
dent’s ability to propose an initial budget”); see also LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
FLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 218-22 (6th ed. 2014) (noting the executive-
empowering features of the 1921 Act); SCHICK, supra note 32, at 14 (suggesting that the 1921 
Act ushered in an era of “presidential dominance” of the budget process). 
36. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, Reconciliation, supra note 5, at 608-09 (contrasting the 104th Con-
gress’s loss of standing with the public with President Clinton’s soaring approval ratings dur-
ing the 1995-96 government shutdown); see also Krishnakumar, Debt Limit, supra note 5, at 
174, 175 (describing failed congressional efforts to attach policy riders to must-pass debt limit 
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loses in these situations.
37
 I take some issue in Part II with his recommendation 
that Congress use the power to shut down the government more often to extract 
concessions from the President, mostly because my work in the area
38
 makes me 
nervous when the annual budget process is used in a game of high-stakes 
chicken. Failure to fund government agencies, for example, can lead to delays in 
the payment of program beneﬁts to eligible recipients and permanently lost 
wages for government employees; further, refusals to increase the debt limit can 
have enormous ﬁscal and reputational costs for the nation, including costing the 
Treasury billions of dollars in increased interest payments.
39
 But as Part II elab-
orates, a second reason for skepticism about aggressive use of government shut-
downs is that modern developments in how the budget process works—like the 
debt limit statute, the growth of the administrative state, and the expansion of 
media coverage—have stacked the deck in favor of automatic congressional ap-
proval or renewal of spending commitments. The result is that Congress is likely 
to lose the public perception battle if it attempts to hold annual appropriations 
bills hostage in a manner that harkens back to the colonial assemblies’ petulant 
refusal to appropriate funds to celebrate the King’s birthday or to pay governors 
and army officials for their work.
40
 
 
increase bills during budget showdowns with the President, and arguing that Congress rather 
than the President likely would bear the political blame for provoking a debt limit default). 
37. The 2011 shutdown provides an important counterexample, suggesting that when the Presi-
dent faces signiﬁcant voter backlash (in 2011, many voters were upset by the passage of the 
Affordable Care Act, and many Republican members of Congress felt emboldened by voters’ 
anger), Congress may be able to overcome his structural budget process advantages and ex-
tract concessions from him. 
38. See sources cited supra note 5. 
39. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-701, DEBT LIMIT: ANALYSIS OF 2011-
2012 ACTIONS TAKEN AND EFFECT OF DELAYED INCREASE ON BORROWING COSTS 22-23 (2012), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592832.pdf [http://perma.cc/QA8N-YMBN] (noting that 
the delay in raising the debt ceiling during the 2011 debt ceiling crisis raised borrowing costs 
for the government by $1.3 billion and would continue to raise costs in later years); Heather 
Long, With the Debt Ceiling, President Trump Is Playing with Fire, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/25/5-reasons-why-hitting-the 
-debt-ceiling-would-be-disastrous [http://perma.cc/6K9V-55FE] (noting that the mere 
threat of default costs the U.S. government hundreds of millions of dollars in increased inter-
est payments on Treasury bonds); Debt Limit Analysis, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. 25 (2012), 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁles/Debt%20Limit
%20Analysis%20Slides.pdf [http://perma.cc/MR5S-KT2P] (estimating that the delay in 
raising the debt ceiling in 2011 raised borrowing costs by $18.9 billion over ten years). 
40. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
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2. The Personnel Power 
Chafetz also discusses Congress’s “personnel power” in detail and urges 
Congress to deploy this power more vigorously. The personnel power encom-
passes three different forms of congressional authority over executive branch ap-
pointments and officials: (1) impeachment; (2) conﬁrmation; and (3) removal. 
The summary below focuses on impeachment and conﬁrmation. 
The leading lesson from Chafetz’s historical primer is that legislative control 
over the personnel of the state originated, and primarily has been used, as a tool 
to ensure “responsible government.” As Chafetz explains, “responsible govern-
ment is ‘those laws, customs, conventions, and practices that serve to make min-
isters of the King rather than the King himself responsible for the acts of the 
government, and that serve to make those ministers accountable to Parliament 
rather than to the King.’”
41
 Initially, impeachment was the weapon of choice used 
by Parliament to express displeasure with English ministers’ actions,
42
 but in the 
colonies, conﬁrmation and removal soon became important weapons as well.
43
 
A subsidiary lesson from Chafetz’s history is that impeachment has rarely 
been concerned with punishing actual misbehavior, treason, or high crimes and 
misdemeanors committed by the Crown’s ministers, the President, or other ex-
ecutive branch officials. Rather, impeachment historically has been employed 
when Parliament, colonial assemblies, or Congress possessed deep policy disa-
greements with the executive. Indeed, many of Parliament’s early charges against 
the Crown’s ministers were based on trumped-up allegations of treason that ob-
scured the underlying policy differences that constituted the true basis for Par-
liament’s grievances.
44
 In other words, impeachment is a tool that legislatures 
have historically used when they clash with the executive on policy matters, not 
to punish the executive for actual crimes. 
This insight may shed some new perspective on current events, including 
congressional investigations involving President Trump and calls for his im-
peachment.
45
 That is, history suggests that Congress is unlikely to impeach if a 
 
41. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 78 (quoting CLAYTON ROBERTS, THE GROWTH OF RESPONSIBLE GOV-
ERNMENT IN STUART ENGLAND, at viii (1966)). 
42. See id. at 79-88. 
43. See id. at 92-93 (asserting that “it [wa]s clear that by the time of the Revolution many of the 
assemblies were asserting substantial and meaningful control over who held colonial office”). 
44. See, e.g., id. at 84 (describing impeachment proceedings against the Earl of Strafford). 
45. See, e.g., Barry H. Berke et al., Presidential Obstruction of Justice: The Case of Donald J. Trump, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content 
/uploads/2017/10/presidential-obstruction-of-justice-the-case-of-donald-j-trump-ﬁnal.pdf 
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majority of its members ﬁnd themselves on the same side of policy issues as the 
President. Thus, so long as Republican members of Congress agree with Presi-
dent Trump about the major policy issues of the day—e.g., cutting taxes, de-
funding abortion, stiffening immigration laws and penalties—they have no in-
centive to try to use the impeachment power to extract concessions from him. 
Democrats, by contrast, want to use whatever hook they can to exert pressure on 
President Trump because they are deeply dissatisﬁed with his policy agenda.
46
 
But in neither case is the underlying focus on whether the President or members 
of his staff have violated the law; rather, Congress’s focus is on whether impeach-
ment will help it to ensure responsible government—i.e., policy control over the 
President. In Part II, I question whether at some point in an investigation, non-
partisan factors such as good government or public outrage over the obstruction 
of justice (at issue in the Watergate investigation and Clinton impeachment) 
may force Congress’s hand. In such cases, Congress may be compelled to im-
peach a President it sees no need to rein in, policy-wise, because of the public’s 
demand that he be punished.
47
 
Importantly, impeachment is not a power that Chafetz urges Congress to as-
sert more aggressively. Rather, recognizing the gravity of this power, he applauds 
Congress’s limited use of it across history.
48
 Nor is impeachment a power that 
Congress has abandoned or allowed to fall into disuse. But as Part II discusses, 
it may be a power over which Congress has lost some control—insofar as public 
engagement, stoked by twenty-four-hour media coverage, could pressure Con-
gress to impeach the President or a high-level executive branch official even 
when members of Congress themselves do not wish to do so.
49
 
Chafetz’s history also reveals, unsurprisingly, that Congress has tended to 
most vigorously ﬂex its personnel powers—whether in the form of removal, im-
 
[http://perma.cc/2UAL-LPGN]; Melina Delkic, Trump Obstructed Justice in Russia Investiga-
tion and Could Be Impeached, New Think Tank Report Claims, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 10, 2017, 12:55 
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/president-donald-trump-impeachment-paper-brookings
-institution-681546 [http://perma.cc/RMT8-NGHA]. 
46. See Catherine Campo, Democrats Warn Trump Not To Impede Mueller’s Russia Probe, CNBC 
(Oct. 30, 2017, 1:26 PM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/30/democrats-call-for-muellers
-russia-probe-to-continue-without-obstruction.html [http://perma.cc/96XA-7YDM]; No-
lan D. McCaskill, Six Democrats Demand Trump Impeachment Hearings, POLITICO (Nov. 15, 
2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/15/trump-impeachment-democrats-244927 
[http://perma.cc/87Y8-7E43]. 
47. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
48. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 150-51. 
49. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
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peachment, or refusals to conﬁrm—during divided government, when the Pres-
ident’s standing with the public or within his own party is weak.
50
 Thus, Chafetz 
describes how the weak and unpopular President Tyler, who assumed office after 
the death of William Henry Harrison and quickly alienated members of both 
parties, saw the Senate reject eight of nine Supreme Court nominations and 
seven of twenty cabinet nominations.
51
 Conversely, when the popular President 
Lincoln was in office, Congress expanded the Court’s size to ten in order to give 
him an appointment; after Lincoln was assassinated, Congress reduced the 
Court’s size to seven to prevent the unpopular President Johnson from making 
any appointments to the Court.
52
 
Chafetz draws from these and other historical examples the lesson that Con-
gress’s personnel power includes the power to create offices and to decide which 
offices require Senate conﬁrmation.
53
 This leads him to endorse the provocative 
idea, put forward by Bruce Ackerman, that Congress can and should require 
Senate conﬁrmation for all signiﬁcant White House staffers.
54
 This is justiﬁed, 
Chafetz argues, “when we remember that the origins of the legislative personnel 
power lie in the development of responsible government. Congress is well within 
its rights to seek responsibility and responsiveness from even, and perhaps es-
pecially, the president’s closest advisers—his privy council, if you will.”
55
 In other 
words, Chafetz argues that the President’s closest advisers should be responsible 
to Congress, just as the British monarch’s closest ministers were responsible to 
Parliament. I am sympathetic to this suggestion as a matter of abstract historical 
and constitutional analysis. But as discussed in Part II, I question whether (1) 
our now-longstanding past practice of allowing the President to pick his closest 
advisers has become a “sticky” precedent that cannot be undone at this stage; 
and (2) the public would perceive a congressional attempt to insert itself into the 
President’s process of selecting his closest advisers as an unseemly power grab.
56
 
3. The Speech or Debate Power 
Congress’s Constitution also champions the Speech or Debate Clause as a 
source of power that Congress can and should use to check the executive branch. 
 
50. See, e.g., CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 111-13. 
51. See id. at 111-12. 
52. See id. at 112. 
53. See id. at 121. 
54. See id. at 122. 
55. Id. 
56. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
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Speciﬁcally, Chafetz points to the immunity that legislators enjoy for actions 
taken within the statehouse and urges them to use that immunity to disseminate 
information to the public.
57
 Chafetz identiﬁes two categories of legislative be-
havior that arguably should be protected under the Clause: (1) legislators’ com-
munications with their own constituents; and (2) the release of “state secrets” or 
“classiﬁed information.”
58
 This Review will focus on the second category, and 
Chafetz’s suggestion that Congress should rehabilitate its past practice of check-
ing the executive by judiciously releasing classiﬁed matter to the public. 
As always, Congress’s Constitution provides numerous colorful historical ex-
amples of congressional exercise of the power to “leak” classiﬁed information 
under the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause. One such example is the 
leak of the Pentagon Papers, 4,100 pages of which were read on the House ﬂoor 
and then placed into the public record of the relevant subcommittee by Mike 
Gravel, “a little-known senator from Alaska”
59
 the night before the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued its famous ruling allowing the Papers to be published by the New 
York Times and the Washington Post.
60
 Similarly, in 1973, Representative Michael 
Harrington leaked to the press the substance of testimony by CIA director Wil-
liam Colby regarding CIA activities during a military coup in Chile.
61
 Public re-
action to that leak led to legislation expanding presidential and congressional 
oversight of the CIA.
62
 And shortly after the First Gulf War, Chairman Henry B. 
Gonzalez of the House Banking Committee repeatedly read aloud from classiﬁed 
documents on the House ﬂoor and placed several documents in the legislative 
record;
63
 the documents showed that the George H.W. Bush Administration had 
been cozying up to the Iraqi regime just months before Iraq invaded Kuwait.
64
 
 
57. For an example of the Speech or Debate Clause providing congressional immunity for actions 
on the ﬂoor, see United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966). 
58. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 215. 
59. Id. at 216. 
60. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam). Indeed, even after that 
ruling, Gravel thought the newspapers were too cautious and published too little of the ma-
terial contained in the Papers, and so “arranged to have the entire ‘4,100-page subcommittee 
record’ published by Beacon Press.” CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 216 (quoting MIKE GRAVEL & 
JOE LAURIA, A POLITICAL ODYSSEY: THE RISE OF AMERICAN MILITARISM AND ONE MAN’S FIGHT 
TO STOP IT 50-51 (2008)). 
61. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 218. 
62. Id. at 218-19 (citing CECIL V. CRABB, JR. & PAT M. HOLT, INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, 
THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN POLICY 164 (1980); L. BRITT SNIDER, THE AGENCY AND THE 
HILL: CIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS, 1946-2004, at 32-33 (2008)). 
63. Id. at 219. 
64. Id. at 220. 
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Chafetz describes these episodes as heroic acts by members of Congress. And 
he contrasts them unfavorably with recent disclosures of classiﬁed information 
by Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden.
65
 Perhaps most intriguingly, 
Chafetz suggests that it would be better if executive branch actors like Snowden 
and Manning leaked to members of Congress rather than “engag[e] in indis-
criminate public releases.”
66
 That is, it would be better to have the “ﬁnal decision 
on releasing information to the public . . . made by a democratically accountable 
official, who would be likely to exercise at least some measure of care—as Senator 
Gravel did—to avoid releasing especially damaging information.”
67
 Members of 
Congress, Chafetz believes, would be more cautious about the information they 
leaked, perhaps exercising greater judgment and care to redact where appropri-
ate. (Chafetz’s concerns are not imaginary; there is evidence that some of the 
materials Snowden leaked were improperly redacted, leading to the exposure of 
intelligence activity against al-Qaeda.
68
) 
It is worth noting that the power to leak classiﬁed information is not one that 
Congress appears to have abandoned in recent years. Indeed, as Chafetz chroni-
cles, some members of Congress have exercised this power as recently as 2011, 
when Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall “announced on the Senate ﬂoor that 
the Obama Administration had adopted a secret, implausible interpretation of 
portions of the [PATRIOT] Act dealing with domestic surveillance,” and subse-
quently sent an open letter to Attorney General Eric Holder publicizing their 
concerns about this secret legal interpretation.
69
 Senators Wyden and Udall did 
not release the details of the secret interpretation itself, but they did specify the 
provision of the PATRIOT Act at issue.
70
 Their disclosure prompted news in-
vestigations and lawsuits by public interest groups and was ultimately clariﬁed 
 
65. See, e.g., Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges Snowden with Espionage, WASH.  
POST (June 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us 
-charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc
_story.html [http://perma.cc/3UM4-Z392]; Julie Tate, Manning Apologizes, Says He ‘Hurt the 
United States’ by Giving Documents to WikiLeaks, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/manning-apologizes-said-he 
-hurt-the-united-states/2013/08/14/e1de6cb4-0525-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/7MB9-BYXS]. 
66. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 223. 
67. Id. 
68. See, e.g., Alan Yuhas, John Oliver Presses Edward Snowden on Whether He Read All Leaked NSA 
Material, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015
/apr/06/edward-snowden-john-oliver-last-week-tonight-nsa-leaked-documents [http://
perma.cc/4AFV-T5HW]. 
69. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 221. 
70. See id. 
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in the leaks made by Edward Snowden.
71
 Highlighting the power to leak as an 
underappreciated congressional power, and contrasting leaks by members of 
Congress with leaks by executive branch employees, Chafetz seems to be calling 
for more detailed or more regular disclosures by congressional members—per-
haps in order to discourage executive branch employees from ﬁlling the void (as 
Snowden arguably did when he dumped documents that Senators Wyden and 
Udall had been unwilling to reveal). 
B. The New Marbury v. Madisons 
One of the most valuable and intriguing contributions that Congress’s Consti-
tution makes to the literature is its exposition of a shift of power from Congress 
to the judiciary during the twentieth century. The story of this shift is important 
but risks getting buried given commentators’ current preoccupations with 
checking a dangerous and dysfunctional executive branch. As part of this shift, 
two nonlegislative powers in particular have suffered substantial judicial en-
croachment: (1) Congress’s power to punish third parties acting in contempt of 
Congress; and (2) Congress’s power to discipline its own members. As Chafetz 
demonstrates, the loss of these congressional powers was not merely accidental, 
but the result of deliberate and opportunistic judicial power grabs and congres-
sional acquiescence in those grabs. I use the term the “new Marbury v. Madisons” 
to describe these judicial usurpations because in both contexts, the judiciary 
seized the authority to decide certain categories of legal and political questions 
for itself, diminishing Congress’s authority to decide those same questions in the 
process—much as Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury seized the power of judicial 
review for the Court.
72
 
Consider, ﬁrst, Congress’s power to punish third parties, including executive 
branch officials, for acting in contempt of Congress—typically by refusing to 
produce subpoenaed documents.
73
 Chafetz provides a long history of parliamen-
tary and congressional use of the power to hold private citizens and the Crown 
or executive branch officials in contempt—including arresting members of the 
 
71. See id. 
72. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
73. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 176-78 (describing the use of the contempt power against the 
Minister to China, George F. Seward, and the threat to use the contempt power against a 
reporter who helped expose a scandal involving U.S. Attorney H. Snowden Marshall). 
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executive branch
74
—and argues that “in order for legislative oversight to be ef-
fective in rooting out executive-branch malevolence and incompetence, Con-
gress must . . . have the power to hold executive-branch officials in contempt.”
75
 
This history is followed by a compelling story about how Congress, in recent 
history, has ceded its power to enforce its own contempt citations to the courts. 
According to Chafetz, the cession of power began when Congress started turning 
to the courts to enforce its contempt citations, rather than issuing punishment 
itself when faced with recalcitrant witnesses or refusals to produce documents. 
Chafetz argues that Watergate in particular acted as a turning point in the demise 
of Congress’s contempt power.
76
 In 1973, when the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities demanded ﬁve tapes of White House conver-
sations between President Nixon and his aide John Dean, Nixon famously as-
serted executive privilege and refused to produce the tapes.
77
 At that point, the 
Select Committee chose to go to court, seeking a declaratory judgment from the 
judiciary affirming that it had a right to the tapes, rather than holding the Pres-
ident in contempt itself.
78
 In Chafetz’s telling, Congress surrendered its inherent 
power to subpoena and insist on compliance—and the courts took advantage of 
this transfer of power, declaring themselves to be the exclusive, ﬁnal arbiters of 
whether executive branch officials (and presumably anyone else) must comply 
with congressionally issued subpoenas.
79
 
In Senate Select Committee, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia balanced the public interest in obtaining the subpoenaed information against 
the President’s right to executive privilege and ruled that the public interest did 
not outweigh the privilege—noting that the tapes were available in proceedings 
before grand juries investigating Watergate and that requiring disclosure to 
Congress as well would “imply that the judicial process has not been or will not 
be effective in this matter.”
80
 In other words, the court privileged its own judicial 
 
74. Id. at 176-79. 
75. Id. at 181-82. 
76. Id. at 182. 
77. See id. 
78. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521, 521-
22 (D.D.C.), aff ’d, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
79. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 183. 
80. 370 F. Supp. at 524. 
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branch investigation over Congress’s investigation of Watergate.
81
 Chafetz con-
vincingly argues that “[t]he courts thus made themselves the heroes of the Wa-
tergate story, and in the process they sent the message that Congress was not up 
to the task.”
82
 This insight about the devastating effect that the Watergate exec-
utive privilege cases had on Congress’s contempt power is incisive—and a highly 
valuable contribution of the book. Congress, as Chafetz explains, has largely ac-
quiesced in this transfer of power to the judiciary, and this in turn has dimin-
ished Congress’s standing in the public sphere and left it less able to assert a 
strong institutional role in checking the executive branch. 
As with many of the other powers he examines, Chafetz looks longingly 
backward at Congress’s contempt power and laments that “[u]ntil the late twen-
tieth century, the legislative house was generally understood to be the ﬁnal judge 
of legislative contempts.”
83
 He encourages Congress, which has to date capitu-
lated and acquiesced in the judiciary’s assertion of authority to decide who must 
comply with a congressional subpoena, to rehabilitate its contempt power—that 
is, to use its own inherent powers to enforce its subpoenas,
84
 rather than turn to 
 
81. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 183 (“The result of the suite of executive privilege cases arising 
out of Watergate, then, was an assertion by the courts that executive privilege claims are 
stronger against Congress than they are against criminal process.”). 
82. Id. The problem has since been compounded, as subsequent congressional subpoenas, such 
as those issued to Bush Administration executive branch officials Harriet Miers and Joshua 
Bolten to testify and produce documents, have ended in further arrogation of power by the 
judiciary. See Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 71 (D.D.C. 2008) (ﬁnding 
that the dispute was of “the sort that is traditionally amenable to judicial resolution” because 
“(1) in essence, this lawsuit merely seeks enforcement of a subpoena, which is a routine and 
quintessential judicial task; and (2) the Supreme Court has held that the judiciary is the ﬁnal 
arbiter of executive privilege, and the grounds asserted for the Executive’s refusal to comply 
with the subpoena are ultimately rooted in executive privilege” (citing United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683 (1974))). 
83. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 190. 
84. Congress has long been deemed to possess an inherent power to declare persons who obstruct 
its legislative or investigative processes to be in contempt of Congress. See McGrain v. Daugh-
erty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821); TODD GARVEY, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE (2017). Con-
gress’s inherent contempt power is not speciﬁcally enumerated in the Constitution, but it is 
considered necessary to investigate and legislate effectively. GARVEY, supra, at 10. In the mod-
ern era, the contempt power has most often been employed in response to a witness’s refusal 
to comply with a congressional subpoena—whether in the form of a refusal to provide testi-
mony or a refusal to produce requested documents. See, e.g., Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 
125 (1935) (holding that destruction of documentary evidence subpoenaed by a congressional 
committee can constitute punishable contempt). Under the inherent contempt power, the ob-
structing individual is brought before the House or Senate by the Sergeant-at-Arms, tried at 
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the courts. Indeed, he notes that “each house has a sergeant-at-arms, and the 
Capitol building has its own jail.”
85
 “The sergeant can be sent to arrest contem-
nors,” he urges. And he observes that even if an arrested contemnor ﬁles a habeas 
petition in court, at that point Congress can argue that the courts “should limit 
[their] inquiry to the question of whether the [arresting] house [is] jurisdiction-
ally competent to hold the contemnor”—i.e., whether the contemnor’s alleged 
infraction in fact amounts to contempt of Congress—and if so, the courts should 
let Congress’s internal enforcement procedures play out.
86
 
As much as I love the historical specter of Congress asserting itself in this 
manner, I think Chafetz is overly nostalgic and idealistic about the assertion of 
this congressional power. The historical precedent is there. But it is distant and 
far removed from the present day. I am sympathetic to Chafetz’s argument that 
Congress unwittingly gave away its power to punish contempt and unwisely ac-
quiesced in the judiciary’s seizure of this power. But for reasons discussed in de-
tail in Part II, I also believe that the ship has sailed on Congress’s exercise of the 
power to arrest contemnors and that it is too late to resurrect it in the manner 
Chafetz recommends.
87
 
A second instance Chafetz highlights in which the judiciary seized some part 
of a signiﬁcant nonlegislative congressional power involves Congress’s power to 
discipline its own members. As in other chapters, Congress’s Constitution begins 
with a detailed and illuminating historical arc of internal discipline by legislative 
bodies from Parliament to colonial assemblies to Congress, both in the early 
years of the Republic and through the modern era.
88
 It notes, for example, that 
“colonial assemblies ‘over and over again’ disciplined their members for offenses 
ranging from absenteeism to ‘scandalous’ papers to unparliamentary conduct, 
and the assemblies’ power to do so went largely unquestioned.”
89
 
Importantly, the history of internal congressional discipline reveals that 
prosecution in the courts for “ethics” violations by members of Congress—i.e., 
the exercise of inﬂuence over members in a manner believed to corrupt their 
judgment—is a recent development.
90
 The ﬁrst case Chafetz could ﬁnd in which 
 
the bar of the body, and may be imprisoned or detained in the Capitol or elsewhere. GARVEY, 
supra, at 10. 
85. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 193. 
86. Id. at 193-94. 
87. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
88. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 232-53. 
89. Id. at 239 (quoting MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN 
COLONIES 185-90 (1943)). 
90. Id. at 253-54. 
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members of Congress were convicted in federal court for ethics transgressions 
occurred in the ﬁrst decade of twentieth century; prior to that, it was understood 
that internal discipline was up to each house to handle.
91
 Moreover, use of the 
disciplinary power to address “ethics” violations at all is a relatively modern phe-
nomenon.
92
 
As with the contempt power, Congress’s Constitution shows that once Con-
gress began to turn to the courts for enforcement, the courts (and the executive) 
quickly seized authority over congressional discipline for themselves. Criminal 
proceedings before grand juries became the normal venue for investigating and 
punishing offending legislators, with Congress deferring to those proceedings 
rather than pressing its own inquiries.
93
 Chafetz’s history chronicles how over 
time, primary responsibility for ethics enforcement shifted away from Congress 
and toward the executive and the courts—to the point where today, congres-
sional members who engage in serious ethical improprieties are no longer inves-
tigated or tried by their own chambers, but instead have their cases prosecuted 
and decided by the executive and judicial branches.
94
 Chafetz laments this shift, 
arguing: 
When congressional ethics violations are prosecuted by the executive and 
adjudicated by the courts, those branches get to play the heroes as they 
ferret out corruption by powerful actors in the name of the public inter-
est. Meanwhile, congressional enforcement is relegated to the status of 
an also-ran . . . . The message sent to the public is that Congress protects 
its own, handing out slaps on the wrist at most, and that only the execu-
tive and the courts can be trusted to keep politics clean.
95
 
Congress’s Constitution notes that both houses of Congress have accepted this 
shift of power over the investigation and discipline of members of Congress to 
the judiciary, treating criminal proceedings as the primary forum for enforcing 
congressional ethics.
96
 Chafetz casts this shift, along with the Supreme Court’s 
 
91. Id. at 250-51, 254. 
92. Id. at 253. 
93. Id. at 256 (describing the cases of John Langley of Kentucky and Frederick Zihlman of Mary-
land). 
94. Id. at 255; see also id. at 261 (discussing the examples of Dan Rostenkowski, Duke Cunning-
ham, Bob Ney, and Tom DeLay, all of whom were indicted or convicted in criminal proceed-
ings, but none of whom were subjected to any form of internal congressional discipline). 
95. Id. at 255. 
96. See id. at 259-60 & nn.219-21. Chafetz notes, for example, that in 1972 the House Ethics Com-
mittee reported out a resolution expressing the sense of the House that a member convicted 
of a crime that carried a sentence of at least two years in jail should refrain from participating 
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ruling in Powell v. McCormack,
97
 as another usurpation of power by the judiciary. 
In Powell, as in the Watergate executive privilege cases, the Court took power for 
itself, pronouncing that Congress had failed to properly follow its own internal 
rules about votes to expel versus exclude a member, and going so far as to set 
aside a congressional vote to exclude a member.
98
 As Chafetz observes, it is re-
markable that the Court ruled on the propriety of Congress’s vote to exclude at 
all, when it simply could have deferred to Congress’s interpretation of its own 
internal rules.
99
 
Chafetz recommends that Congress take back, or rehabilitate, the discipli-
nary power it has ceded to the judiciary (or allowed the judiciary to usurp). He 
hails, for example, the creation of the House Office of Congressional Ethics 
(OCE) and Ethics Committee, and offers reasonable recommendations to im-
prove how they function—e.g., adopting a similar office for the Senate or giving 
the OCE and Ethics Committee jurisdiction over former members so members 
cannot simply escape discipline from their chamber if they resign or lose reelec-
tion.
100
 Chafetz’s history is compelling, and I agree with his assessment that 
Congress has disempowered itself and diminished its public credibility by leav-
ing discipline of its members to the other branches. Further, Chafetz may be 
correct in theory that entities like OCE, which is required to act when certain 
conditions are met, can be useful in getting Congress back into the business of 
investigating its own members. However, the history recounted in Congress’s 
Constitution reveals that partisanship has long played a signiﬁcant role in 
whether Congress disciplines its members and in the punishments it metes 
out.
101
 As discussed in Part II, I question whether, in practice, factors such as 
partisanship, reluctance to go after one’s friends, and the judiciary’s own interest 
 
in House business until the conviction was overturned or the member was reelected. See id. at 
259. The report accompanying the resolution stated that “where an allegation involves a pos-
sible violation of statutory law, . . . the policy has been to defer action until the judicial pro-
ceedings have run their course.” See id. at 259-60. 
97. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
98. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was a senior member of the House of Representatives who became 
embroiled in an ethics scandal. Id. at 490. The House voted to exclude him from his seat, and 
Powell sued, claiming that the vote to exclude amounted to an expulsion, which had not oc-
curred. Id. at 493. The Court agreed; it held that the House could exclude a member only for 
failure to meet the qualiﬁcations for office speciﬁed in Art. I, § 2, cls. 1-2 and that so long as a 
member met those qualiﬁcations (which Powell did), the only way the House could prevent 
him from taking his seat was through a vote to expel, which required a two-thirds superma-
jority. See id. at 506-12. 
99. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 254-55. 
100. See id. at 263-64. 
101. See id. at 253. 
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in retaining power will stand in the way of meaningful reinvigoration of this 
congressional power. 
*** 
As Congress’s Constitution demonstrates, the demise (or transfer) of Con-
gress’s various nonlegislative powers occurred in a number of ways. In some 
cases, Congress stopped exercising a particular constitutional power on its own, 
or at least stopped exercising the power in the aggressive manner employed by 
earlier Congresses, Parliament, and colonial assemblies.
102
 In other cases, an-
other branch stepped in to claim powers previously exercised by Congress, and 
Congress silently or expressly acquiesced in the other branch’s actions.
103
 In still 
other cases, Congress agreed to structural changes in the way government is run 
that have had the effect over time of shifting power away from Congress.
104
 In 
each of these cases, Congress voluntarily abnegated its power, although it ap-
pears to have done so gradually and unconsciously rather than deliberately. The 
method by which a particular congressional power was diminished may have 
some bearing on whether Congress can reclaim that power. Speciﬁcally, in cases 
where another branch seized a congressional power, it may be difficult for Con-
gress to seize back the power, particularly if the other branch has perpetuated a 
narrative about its institutional ownership of the power or its superiority vis-à-
vis Congress in exercising the power—e.g., the insufficiency of self-executed eth-
ics investigations, the scope of executive privilege, and the value of judicial inde-
pendence. Similarly, where structural changes that diminish Congress’s powers 
have long been in place—e.g., the administrative state and changes to the budget 
process—it may be difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to turn back the clock 
and exercise old powers in the manner it once did. Indeed, Congress’s best hope 
for resurrecting its power may lie in those powers that were diminished due to 
congressional disuse alone, without complicating factors such as encroachment 
by other branches or structural changes in how the government operates. As the 
next Part elaborates, it likely would be easier for Congress to reinvigorate, for 
example, its power to leak classiﬁed information—which no other branch has 
appropriated—than to reclaim the power to punish contempts of Congress by 
arresting offenders. 
 
102. This was how the power to arrest persons in contempt of Congress, the power to leak classi-
ﬁed information, and the appropriations-related power to zero out salaries fell into disuse. 
103. This describes how Congress ceded to the judiciary the power to conduct ethics investigations 
of congressional members and the power to review and punish refusals to comply with con-
gressional subpoenas. 
104. These include changes to the budget process that made speciﬁc appropriations a small feature 
of the annual budget and the creation and expansion of the administrative state, which em-
powered the executive by delegating many of Congress’s powers to agencies headed by his 
appointees. 
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i i .  some obstacles to rehabilitating congress’s  powers 
This Part questions whether some of the underappreciated congressional 
powers that Congress’s Constitution recommends rehabilitating may be difficult to 
resurrect as a practical matter or undesirable to revive as a normative one. I argue 
that while Chafetz’s historical research is compelling and paints a picture of 
strong congressional power, in some cases that history may be too ancient or 
attenuated to support aggressive contemporary congressional action. There is a 
ﬁne line between sharing the lessons of history and indulging in outright nos-
talgia for a distant and unrecoverable past, and some of Chafetz’s recommenda-
tions have the distinct feel of wistful remembrance rather than viable historical 
lessons that can be applied in the present. 
Notably, historical developments and past practice—including changes to 
the budget process, the growth of the administrative state, and the professional-
ization of the civil service—may have so changed the constitutional landscape 
that it has become difficult to argue that things should be done the way they were 
in seventeenth-century England, the colonial era, or during Reconstruction. 
Further, the executive and judicial branches are unlikely to quietly cede back 
powers they have gained at Congress’s expense and would likely ﬁght congres-
sional efforts to reclaim those powers. In any battle with the other branches, past 
practice is likely to work against Congress, making it easier for the other 
branches to characterize Congress’s attempts to revive its underused powers as 
unduly aggressive. Indeed, many of these practices and historical developments 
have become “sticky”—by which I mean deeply entrenched and difficult to over-
come absent an exceptional event.
105
 In addition to these external challenges, 
there may be two internal challenges to the rehabilitation of Congress’s un-
derused powers that Chafetz recognizes but undersells: partisanship and short-
sightedness. Party loyalty may, in at least some cases, prevent Congress from 
wanting to assert its nonlegislative powers in the manner Chafetz suggests. And 
partisanship, along with a deterioration of norms, may also lead politicians to 
put short-term political gain ahead of the long-term institutional power of Con-
gress. Section A explores the obstacles that sticky historical precedents may pose 
for Chafetz’s recommendations. Section B explores how partisanship may un-
dermine his proposed assertions of congressional power. Section C offers recent 
examples that highlight the rise of short-term thinking in Congress. 
Before turning to these potential obstacles, however, it is worth pausing to 
say a few words about the role of public perception and support—which Chafetz 
 
105. Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTION 114 (2010) (deﬁning “entrenchment” as “beyond partisan debate”). 
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describes as the determinative factor in whether Congress will be able to success-
fully reassert its powers against the other branches. Chafetz argues that a key 
feature of interbranch conﬂicts—battles over political authority—is that they are 
“public focused.”
106
 Quoting David Mayhew, he explains that “political activity 
takes place before the eyes of an appraising public” and contends that public dis-
course affects the relative power of the branches and shapes how interbranch 
conﬂicts ultimately play out.
107
 As an example, Chafetz notes that a President 
“who enjoys high levels of public support will ﬁnd it much easier to get his way 
with Congress” than a President who does not.
108
 
Chafetz’s “public support” insight is unorthodox, as many scholars view the 
powers held by each branch to be static and speciﬁed by the Constitution, rather 
than constantly evolving.
109
 His account is ultimately convincing, however, be-
cause Congress’s Constitution provides numerous examples of how public dis-
course and opinion (including public outrage) have inﬂuenced the outcome of 
interbranch battles and helped shift the locus of power throughout history. Nev-
ertheless, I disagree with Chafetz about the implications of this insight for Con-
gress’s ability to rehabilitate its long-unused powers. While Chafetz views the 
public discourse element as one that liberates Congress by rendering its consti-
tutional powers constantly open to renegotiation, for at least two reasons I view 
it as one that is equally likely to act as a check on the recapture of congressional 
power. First, in many cases, the public is likely to view congressional attempts to 
seize back powers that have long been exercised by the executive or the judicial 
branch as acts of legislative usurpation—particularly since the other branches are 
likely to cast Congress’s behavior that way, and since Congress’s assertion of such 
powers would go against recent historical practice. 
 
106. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 20 (emphasis omitted). 
107. Id. at 20-21. 
108. Id. at 21. Congress’s Constitution contains other similar examples of public engagement playing 
a role in determining which branch wins a political battle. See, e.g., id. at 10-13 (describing 
President Obama’s public warnings about judicial activism while the Supreme Court was re-
viewing the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act and the effect of public discourse on 
the Court’s ultimate ruling); id. at 218-19 (describing leaks of classiﬁed information about 
CIA misdeeds and arguing that public criticism resulting from the disclosures played a role in 
the passage of legislation expanding presidential and congressional oversight of the CIA). 
109. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1939, 1947 (2011) (contending that the Constitution “reﬂects countless context-speciﬁc 
choices about how to assign, structure, divide, blend, and balance federal power”); John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpreta-
tion and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752-53 (2009) (arguing that the 
constitution “must be given the meaning on which its enactors voted”). 
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Second, in the modern era, there is very little public support for the kind of 
obstructionism that would result from Congress’s aggressive assertion of many 
of its nonlegislative powers in the manner Chafetz recommends—e.g., zeroing 
out salaries and forcing government shutdowns to win concessions from the ex-
ecutive. When Parliament, colonial assemblies, and early Congresses zeroed out 
salaries or refused to legislate until their grievances were addressed, they did not 
do so under the watchful eye of the public. Moreover, those earlier legislatures 
acted at a time when government regulation—and congressional action relating 
to such regulation—was far less prevalent or necessary for the delivery of services 
expected by citizens than in the modern era.
110
 Today, by contrast, technology 
and the twenty-four-hour news cycle ensure that the public is aware of every 
minute, petty action taken by either side during an interbranch conﬂict, and me-
dia coverage itself inﬂuences the public’s perception of which branch is in the 
right.
111
 A Congress that seeks to hold legislation, salaries, or government fund-
ing hostage in order to get its way risks playing into common perceptions that it 
is obstructionist and dysfunctional.
112
 Indeed, in the modern era, what the pub-
lic wants most from Congress may be real legislative accomplishments, not fur-
ther use of nonlegislative tools to gum up the works and prevent action. 
For these reasons, some of Chafetz’s recommended reassertions of nonlegis-
lative congressional power could ultimately undermine, rather than restore, pub-
lic faith in Congress. This disagreement over whether the public is likely to sup-
port Congress’s efforts to rehabilitate its long-dormant nonlegislative powers 
 
110. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 55-56 (5th ed. 2014) (contrasting the Found-
ers’ conception of the legislative process—that few laws should be enacted and that private 
autonomy and free markets should reign free—with the post-New Deal regulatory state, in 
which governmental regulation and the enactment of statutes may be the expected norm). 
111. See Robert Bejesky, How Security Threat Discourse Can Precipitate a Press Clause Death Spiral, 
63 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 42 (2015) (“The media selects the story, ﬁlters the sources for the story, 
and chooses how to present the news to the public, which inﬂuences the viewing populace’s 
perceptions about events in the world.”). 
112. See, e.g., Congress in a Wordle, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.pewresearch.org
/2010/03/22/congress-in-a-wordle [http://perma.cc/7GKK-A5UL] (noting that when asked 
to describe Congress in one word, eighty-six percent of respondents “said something nega-
tive”; the “three most frequently offered terms were dysfunctional . . . , corrupt . . . and some 
version of selﬁsh”; and that “[m]any of the words reﬂected perceptions that Congress has 
been unable or unwilling to enact legislation (inept, confusing, gridlock, etc.)”); Public Says 
Dysfunctional Government Is Nation’s Top Problem, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/10/public-says-dysfunctional-government 
-is-nations-top-problem [http://perma.cc/7Z3B-QCBW] (reporting that ﬁfty-one percent 
of survey respondents were “frustrated” with the federal government, with thirty-six percent 
of respondents saying that the reason Congress cannot get things done is a few members who 
refuse to compromise). 
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informs much of the discussion about sticky historical precedents, partisanship, 
and shortsightedness that follows in the next three Sections. 
A. “Sticky” Historical Developments and Precedents 
A central contention of Congress’s Constitution is that the authority possessed 
by political actors is not static but, rather, is “continually being worked out 
through constitutional politics.”
113
 Chafetz argues throughout that “[p]olitical 
institutions are involved in constant contestation, not simply for the substantive 
outcomes they desire, but also for the authority to determine those outcomes.”
114
 
In other words, Chafetz believes that in the context of everyday politics—e.g., 
judicial review of the Affordable Care Act, or Senate conﬁrmation of the Presi-
dent’s choice for FBI Director—questions of political authority are at stake along-
side substantive outcomes, and the branches’ relative authority is constantly be-
ing renegotiated. Every political conﬂict, perhaps even every political interaction 
between the branches, therefore, carries the potential to reshape congressional 
authority. 
While I admire Chafetz’s lofty vision, I am skeptical of his dynamic concep-
tion of constantly evolving constitutional authority—at least in some cases. With 
respect to a number of the nonlegislative powers that Chafetz urges Congress to 
revive or assert more aggressively, I worry that Congress’s past abandonment or 
muted use of the power, or another branch’s usurpation of the power, has estab-
lished a sticky historical precedent that is difficult to reverse. In other cases, his-
torical developments, such as changes in the way the government is run since 
the Founding—e.g., the emergence of the administrative state and the profes-
sionalization of the civil service—have shifted power to the executive, or simply 
away from Congress, in a manner that creates sticky vested interests or public 
expectations. These shifts render it difficult, as a practical matter, for Congress 
to reassert its authority in the manner Chafetz suggests. 
In using the term “sticky,” I do not mean to suggest that these historical de-
velopments are necessarily irreversible, but rather, that they are deeply en-
trenched and difficult to overcome for the reasons outlined below. It may be pos-
sible to overcome these precedents, but it would take an extraordinary political 
incident to do so—not merely the ordinary interbranch disputes that Chafetz 
seems to view as sufficient to reshape constitutional powers. 
There are a number of reasons certain historical developments and prece-
dents are likely to be sticky and to interfere with the renewed exercise of Con-
gress’s nonlegislative powers. First, some historical developments are sticky in 
 
113. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 67. 
114. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
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the sense that they permanently recalibrate the playing ﬁeld on which Congress 
and the other branches compete for authority. The expansion of media coverage, 
for example, is a historical development that has enhanced the President’s power 
to speak directly to the public, thereby enhancing his power vis-à-vis Con-
gress.
115
 Similarly, the enactment of the debt limit statute is a historical develop-
ment that permanently shifted some of Congress’s power of the purse to the ex-
ecutive branch—giving the Treasury Secretary authority to borrow up to the 
statutory limit set by Congress and the President, without seeking congressional 
approval.
116
 The technological advances that have given us modern, twenty-
four-hour media coverage are unlikely to be reversed. Likewise, because the Pres-
ident must sign off on any repeal of the debt limit statute, it is highly unlikely 
that the delegation of power effected by the statute will be undone. 
Second, historical changes in how government works and Congress’s 
longstanding failure to exercise the powers at issue may have created entrenched 
interests that are likely to resist, rather than quietly acquiesce in, congressional 
efforts to aggressively reassert long-dormant powers. The professionalization of 
the civil service, for example, has created thousands of government employees 
who would be harmed by the zeroing out of salaries or departments and who are 
statutorily protected from termination absent good cause.
117
 Similarly, the ex-
pansion of the administrative state has created numerous federal agencies with 
employees and constituencies who are likely to be harmed by and object to con-
gressional efforts to use the agency’s funding as a bargaining chip in budget 
quarrels with the executive. Media coverage of the impact that Congress’s ag-
gressive use of its appropriations power would have on such employees, moreo-
ver, is likely to cast Congress in an unsympathetic light and cost it in the public 
perception battle so crucial to any effort to recapture its ceded powers. 
Third, historical practice may become sticky by creating norms that inﬂuence 
the public’s perception of Congress’s actions. Where Congress has long failed to 
exercise a power or has acquiesced in another branch’s exercise of the power, or 
where historical developments that change the scope of Congress’s power have 
 
115. See, e.g., John D. Castiglione, A Structuralist Critique of the Journalist’s Privilege, 23 J.L. & POL. 
115, 135 (2007) (“The aggrandizement of executive power is especially acute vis-à-vis the leg-
islative and judicial branches when it comes to using the media to meet the White House’s 
political goals . . . .”); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably 
Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 521 (2008) (“The fact that the President can 
demand media attention and use the public culture to his advantage diminishes the visibility, 
and therefore the effectiveness, of a Congress that does not have similar tools.”); see also infra 
notes 133-134 and accompanying text. 
116. This is a partial delegation to the executive of Congress’s constitutional power to borrow. See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; Second Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288 (1917) 
(codiﬁed as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012)). 
117. See Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7513 (2012). 
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long been in effect, the public may come to view certain aspects of the status 
quo—e.g., civil service statutes protecting the tenure of government employees 
or judicial independence—as rights belonging to certain groups or as key fea-
tures of our constitutional system. This may make it difficult for Congress to 
threaten to eliminate those rights or to act in a manner that challenges those 
perceived key features. In other words, once the public comes to regard a histor-
ical development or practice as part of the framework of government, it may be-
come difficult to persuade the public to support congressional efforts to undo 
that historical development or practice. This is particularly so because several of 
the aggressive reassertions of congressional power that Chafetz recommends 
take the form of throwing up roadblocks to prevent needed action, in an effort 
to force the executive to accede to Congress’s demands—think government shut-
downs and refusals to pay official salaries. In such cases, if Congress attempts to 
follow Chafetz’s advice, it may play into public perceptions that it is obstruction-
ist and dysfunctional rather than emerge the hero, as Chafetz hopes. 
Finally, some historical developments that are likely to undermine Chafetz’s 
recommendations have been formally adopted in statutes or judicial decisions 
that are difficult to invalidate. The rules governing the civil service, including 
those establishing qualiﬁcation exams and protecting government employees 
from removal except for cause, are contained in statutes, as is the debt limit pro-
vision and the thousands of enabling statutes establishing federal agencies.
118
 
And the judiciary’s power grabs—e.g., claiming for itself the exclusive authority 
to decide the scope of executive privilege with respect to evidence subpoenaed 
by Congress—are enshrined in judicial decisions.
119
 A congressional reassertion 
of power that conﬂicts with any of these statutes or decisions would thus require 
the violation of established laws or judicial rulings, or the repeal of those laws or 
rulings. Repeal is unlikely since the President would have to sign any repeal stat-
ute, and the judiciary would have to acquiesce in the effective retraction of its 
decision. Accordingly, if Congress were to act to recapture its powers in such 
cases, it would have to act in the face of the current law. Ignoring statutorily 
protected rights or judicial decisions might cause Congress to lose public support 
and, ultimately, the battle to reassert its power. 
Thus, entrenched interests, formalized power shifts, technological advances, 
and their overarching effect on public support may collectively impede Con-
gress’s ability to resurrect at least some of its relinquished powers. The remain-
der of this Section explores how congressional efforts to rehabilitate each of the 
 
118. See id.; Second Liberty Bond Act; Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 
(1883). 
119. See, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521, 
521-22 (D.D.C.), aff ’d, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
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powers discussed in Part I might be affected by speciﬁc sticky historical develop-
ments or precedents. 
1. The Power of the Purse 
Recall from Part I that Congress’s Constitution urges Congress to reassert its 
power of the purse in three concrete ways: (1) being more aggressive in attaching 
riders that forbid the use of funds for certain purposes to appropriations 
measures;
120
 (2) threatening to reduce or eliminate salaries or staff positions as 
a negotiating tactic;
121
 and (3) credibly employing the threat of government 
shutdowns in a manner that wins Congress public support and enables it to ex-
tract concessions from the President.
122
 The latter two recommendations strike 
me as problematic given historical developments since the Founding. In addi-
tion, they are normatively undesirable. 
“Zeroing out” offices or salaries. While Chafetz’s history lesson on parliamen-
tary and congressional withholding of executive salaries is colorful and enter-
taining, it reads like outdated history far removed from the way modern govern-
ment—and particularly the administrative state—works. Withholding the 
governor’s salary or refusing to appropriate funds to celebrate the King’s birth-
day were powerful symbolic acts, but eliminating offices or personnel in our vast 
administrative state is more consequential because it is more likely to prevent 
ordinary citizens from receiving government services. For example, when Con-
gress eliminates federal funding for state-sponsored veterans’ housing pro-
grams, veterans lose their housing and end up on the street.
123
 This is a far cry 
 
120. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 67. 
121. See id. at 66. 
122. See id. at 68-71. 
123. See, e.g., Todd Richmond, Associated Press, Federal Cuts Force WDVA To Stop Housing Home-
less Veterans, U.S. NEWS (July 20, 2017, 6:09 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/best-states
/wisconsin/articles/2017-07-20/federal-cuts-force-wdva-to-stop-housing-homeless-vets 
[http://perma.cc/676M-88M9]. Similarly, when Congress has failed to renew appropriations 
that fund federal employees’ salaries during recent government shutdowns, news reports have 
speculated about whether Social Security, Medicare, and veterans’ beneﬁts would be halted or 
delayed. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Federal Departments Lay Out Plans in the Event of a Government 
Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/us/politics
/07shutdown.html [http://perma.cc/LZU4-N5N6]; Brad Plumer, The Nine Most Painful Im-
pacts of a Government Shutdown, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/10/01/the-nine-most-painful-consequences-of-a-government 
-shutdown [http://perma.cc/QC35-6NWS]; Jennifer Steinhauer, Death Beneﬁts for Soldiers 
To Continue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/us/politics
/pentagon-links-with-charity-to-pay-beneﬁts-to-families-of-service-members-killed-in 
-action.html [http://perma.cc/XUK7-BEDF]; Steve Vogel, VA: All Veterans’ Beneﬁt Payments 
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from the withholding of funds from a powerful external sovereign as an act of 
rebellion against his authority. Cutting off the Supreme Court’s air conditioning 
or refusing to pay judicial clerks, also among Chafetz’s suggestions,
124
 are more 
in line with some of Parliament’s and the colonial assemblies’ actions—but they 
are far pettier behavior than we are accustomed to seeing from our legislators in 
the modern era. Moreover, they are hardly the kind of legislative behaviors—or 
interbranch conﬂict—that should be encouraged. There has already been a lam-
entable coarsening and degradation of the political discourse among the 
branches; congressional behavior such as cutting off the Supreme Court’s air 
conditioning would accelerate that degradation rather than encourage inter-
branch cooperation and respect. 
Further, as a practical matter, two historical developments have changed the 
political landscape against which Congress and the President battle over the 
budget. The ﬁrst development, already mentioned above, is the growth of the 
administrative state and the perception that the funding of certain government 
departments and services is necessary rather than within Congress’s discretion. 
This development makes it likely that in the modern era, congressional actions 
such as eliminating offices or salaries will be viewed by the public as petty and 
inappropriate behavior. The second development, also mentioned above, is the 
professionalization of many of the offices that Congress would eliminate (or 
threaten to eliminate). Innovations such as the civil service have transformed the 
government offices in question from patronage positions ﬁlled by the executive’s 
lackeys into professional positions ﬁlled through examinations and protected by 
good behavior and tenure standards.
125
 This professionalization is a sticky his-
torical development because it has signiﬁcantly changed the political terrain 
upon which both Congress and the President act in selecting, funding, and re-
moving government employees, eliminating much of their discretion over hiring 
and ﬁring decisions. Moreover, professionalization has created a constituency 
with vested rights that would be harmed by aggressive congressional action.
126
 
 
Will Be Disrupted If a Shutdown Goes Beyond Two Weeks, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2013/09/27/va-all-veterans-beneﬁt 
-payments-will-be-disrupted-if-a-shutdown-goes-beyond-two-weeks [http://perma.cc
/9K99-9JZY]. 
124. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 66, 345 n.219 (citing Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 303, 331 (2007)). 
125. See Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 27, §§ 1, 2, 5, 6, 9-14, 22 Stat. 403, 403, 405-07 
(1883); see also CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 113-16 (discussing the work of the Civil Service Com-
mission). 
126. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
REFORM 69-88 (1999) (describing the professionalization of the civil service as a develop-
mental milestone for government); Eric Posner, And If Elected: What President Trump Could or 
the yale law journal 127:880  2018 
912 
In light of these historical developments, efforts by Congress to zero out salaries 
or eliminate government positions as a negotiating tactic for obtaining policy 
concessions from the executive may be viewed by the modern public as partisan 
and petulant behavior, rather than as a legitimate exercise of Congress’s power 
of the purse. Indeed, the executive is sure to cast any efforts to zero out expend-
itures in an unﬂattering light, and given that Congress has not employed the 
power of the purse in this manner for decades, it is difficult to envision it win-
ning this public relations battle. 
Government shutdowns. Recall that Chafetz provocatively characterizes gov-
ernment shutdowns as bargaining chips that present both opportunities and 
dangers for Congress and urges that “artful” action by Congress could earn it 
points with the public and translate to success in policy negotiations.
127
 Chafetz’s 
take is unconventional, but as noted in Part I, he may be correct that commenta-
tors have too quickly dismissed the potential beneﬁts to Congress of credibly and 
“artfully” threatening a government shutdown. 
Still, as a budget scholar, it makes me uneasy when anyone, even someone 
as thoughtful as Chafetz, recommends that Congress employ government shut-
downs as a weapon to force executive compliance with Congress’s priorities.
128
 
Even if we set aside pure budgetary caution, modern developments may have 
reset the stage in at least two ways that tend to favor the President and disfavor 
Congress in most budget showdowns. The ﬁrst is the debt limit statute and the 
periodic need that it creates for Congress to raise the debt ceiling to allow the 
Treasury Secretary to borrow additional funds to service the national debt.
129
 
Historically, when Congress and the President have engaged in a budget show-
down, the debt ceiling has ﬁgured prominently in their interbranch battle.
130
 But 
 
Couldn’t Do, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/opinion/cam
paign-stops/and-if-elected-what-president-trump-could-or-couldnt-do.html [http://perma
.cc/NP36-9XQB] (noting the difficulty of ﬁring civil service employees). 
127. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 69, 71. By “artful” action, Chafetz appears to mean politically 
astute and judicious. He argues, for example, that if Newt Gingrich had been more “skilled” 
and not made “tactical mistakes” such as “personalizing the ﬁght” between himself and Pres-
ident Clinton and “overreading his mandate to press for conservative ﬁscal policy,” or if Pres-
ident Clinton had been less skilled, “we might well remember the 1995–1996 budget show-
down as a win for Congress.” Id. at 69. 
128. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, Reconciliation, supra note 5. 
129. For a detailed history and analysis of the debt limit statute, see Krishnakumar, Debt Limit, 
supra note 5. 
130. All three of the most recent budget showdowns—1995-96, 2011, and 2013—involved a debt 
limit crisis. See, e.g., D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31967, THE DEBT LIMIT: 
HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 21-25 (2015) (discussing the 2011 and 2013 debt limit crises); 
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refusing to raise the debt ceiling is not a realistic or prudent ﬁscal option; failure 
to do so would ultimately result in the United States defaulting on its debt pay-
ments and having its credit rating downgraded—both of which would have per-
nicious consequences domestically and internationally.
131
 Indeed, during the 
2011 budget showdown, the United States’ credit rating was downgraded and 
the stock market plummeted, and during the 2013 showdown, a prominent 
credit-rating agency threatened to downgrade the nation’s rating.
132
 Because the 
debt limit statute puts the Treasury Secretary and President in the position of 
asking Congress to vote to raise the limit, Congress appears obstructionist and 
petty when it holds an increase hostage to budget negotiations with the Presi-
dent. 
A second sticky development that may hinder Congress’s effective use of gov-
ernment shutdowns to recapture some of its lost budgetary power is the media 
and the effective bully pulpit it provides the President in battles with Con-
gress.
133
 Simply put, congressional threats to shut down the government may be 
 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-96-130, DEBT CEILING: ANALYSIS OF AC-
TIONS DURING THE 1995-1996 CRISIS 19-20 (1996), http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155577
.pdf [http://perma.cc/734N-ERAE]. 
131. For example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that the delay in raising 
the debt ceiling increased government borrowing costs by $1.3 billion in 2011 and indicated 
that there would be unestimated higher costs in later years. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 39, at 22. The Bipartisan Policy Center extended the GAO’s estimates to 
later years and concluded that delays in raising the debt ceiling would raise borrowing costs 
by $18.9 billion over ten years. Debt Limit Analysis, supra note 39, at 25; see also Michael Cooper 
& Louise Story, Q. and A. on the Debt Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/07/28/us/politics/28default.html [http://perma.cc/E63G-L536] (detailing the 
negative consequences that could result from the United States defaulting on its debt obliga-
tions); Shushannah Walshe, The Costs of the Government Shutdown, ABC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/10/the-costs-of-the-government-shutdown 
[http://perma.cc/43QC-BFM8] (noting that ﬁnancial rating agency Standard & Poor’s found 
that the shutdown took $24 billion out of the economy as of 2013 and “shaved at least 0.6 
percent off annualized fourth-quarter 2013 GDP growth”). 
132. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum & Eric Dash, S.& P. Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S. for the First 
Time, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/business/us-debt 
-downgraded-by-sp.html [http://perma.cc/CT74-LRAA]; Associated Press, Wall St. Climbs 
as Hopes for Détente on Debt Emerge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013
/10/10/business/daily-stock-market-activity.html [http://perma.cc/JE2Y-TR4A]; Jim Puz-
zanghera, Fitch Warns that Debt-Limit Delay Could Hurt U.S. Credit Rating, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 
15, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/15/business/la-ﬁ-mo-ﬁtch-ratings-debt-limit
-credit-u.s.-20130115 [http://perma.cc/2SNV-9FJN]. 
133. See, e.g., SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 110 
(4th ed. 2007) (describing the presidential practice of using media to solicit public support 
for the President’s legislative program when it becomes stalled in Congress); JEFFREY K. TU-
LIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 186 (1987) (noting that in modern times, the President is 
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perceived differently than parliamentary clashes with the Stuart Crown in part 
because they play out in full view of the public. During the 1995-96 government 
shutdowns, for example, President Clinton cast Newt Gingrich and the 104th 
Congress as bad actors for standing in the way of the administrative state and 
normal government operations and for trying to do away with Medicaid—a mes-
sage he was able to deliver successfully in large part because of his media ac-
cess.
134
 
But beyond these practical concerns, I disagree normatively with Chafetz’s 
argument that more aggressive use of government shutdowns is a desirable way 
to recapture congressional power. Refusing to fund ongoing government oper-
ations in order to force the President to concede on other, unrelated policy mat-
ters is irresponsible and unfair to government employees who lose their 
paychecks during this game of chicken. Similarly, failing to provide the Treasury 
Department with the funds needed to make interest payments on the nation’s 
debts is a reckless, irresponsible move that risks the United States’ credit stand-
ing and jeopardizes the nation’s future borrowing ability. 
Aggressive use of riders. Chafetz also argues that attaching riders to appropri-
ations bills that forbid the use of the funds for speciﬁc purposes is an important 
modern application of Congress’s once robust approval (or disapproval) of every 
speciﬁc spending item.
135
 I agree that riders, particularly those that ban the use 
of funds for certain disfavored expenditures, are a valuable and feasible modern 
application of the power of the purse and that they provide Congress with sub-
stantial leverage to control policy connected to the subject of the rider. During 
the late 1990s, for example, Congress enacted numerous riders limiting or pro-
hibiting the enforcement of several environmental laws.
136
 While riders often are 
 
given more attention by media than any other institution or personality, while in the nine-
teenth century, newspaper coverage of Congress exceeded that of the President). 
134. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREW, SHOWDOWN: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GINGRICH CONGRESS 
AND THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE 323-26 (1996); Krishnakumar, Reconciliation, supra note 5, 
at 608-09 (noting that “the President’s approval ratings soared throughout the shutdown, 
while congressional Republicans’ declined” (citing DAVID MARANISS & MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, 
“TELL NEWT TO SHUT UP!” 146-49, 152-53 (1996))). 
135. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 67-68. 
136. See Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environ-
mental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 642-47 (2006). In 2000, in response to what it perceived to be 
attempts by Clinton appointees to push regulations through before leaving office, Congress 
enacted numerous appropriations riders that, inter alia, placed substantive limits on the De-
partment of the Interior’s ability to promulgate ﬁnal rules pertaining to hard-rock mining, 
restricted the agency’s ability to establish a new national wildlife refuge in a given location, 
and barred the use of funds to study or implement any plan to drain Lake Powell or otherwise 
reduce it to a level below that necessary to operate the Glen Canyon Dam. See Department of 
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criticized as congressional efforts to enact legislation that would not otherwise 
pass or to hold the President hostage because of the must-pass nature of annual 
appropriations,
137
 I agree with Chafetz that they are a legitimate tool for con-
gressional control over policy through the purse strings. Indeed, as Chafetz’s his-
tory lesson shows, Congress originally approved government expenditures one 
at a time, which gave it considerable inﬂuence over policy choices connected to 
each expenditure.
138
 Modern-day riders are a poor substitute for the older, more 
meaningful control over individual appropriations that Congress once enjoyed, 
but they do enable Congress to extract policy concessions on discrete, narrow 
issues. 
Importantly, more aggressive congressional use of riders is unlikely to pre-
sent sticky precedent problems because Congress has never abandoned or ceded 
its authority to employ riders to another branch. Accordingly, although the pub-
lic might perceive Congress to be engaging in an act of gamesmanship when it 
attaches riders, the public will not question Congress’s authority to employ rid-
ers, which it has done since the Founding. Nor will the President, whose power 
would be checked by aggressive congressional use of riders, question Congress’s 
authority to enact such riders—although he might complain publicly about the 
substance of speciﬁc riders. 
2. The Personnel Power 
In Part I, this Review discussed Chafetz’s personnel power recommendations 
with respect to impeachment and conﬁrmation.
139
 Here, I consider each recom-
mendation in turn. 
Impeachment. Perhaps surprisingly, Chafetz does not recommend reinvigor-
ation, or even robust exercise, of the potent congressional power to impeach. 
Rather, while he acknowledges the central role that impeachment played in Brit-
ish and American legislative history, Chafetz recognizes its severity and seems 
content to have it employed only cautiously, as “one mechanism among 
many . . . for maintaining congressional inﬂuence over personnel.”
140
 
 
the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-291, §§ 119, 126, 156, 
114 Stat. 922, 944, 945, 962-63 (2000). 
137. See, e.g., Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 456; Lazarus, supra note 136, at 635; Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacriﬁcing Legislative In-
tegrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457 
(1997). 
138. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 59. 
139. See discussion supra Section I.A.2. 
140. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 150-51. 
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As discussed in Part I above, I ﬁnd the history of legislative use of impeach-
ment to reign in the executive highly illuminating and instructive, and believe 
that it sheds light on why the 115th Republican Congress has shown little incli-
nation to impeach President Trump so far. But I also ﬁnd myself in a bit of a role 
reversal with Chafetz with respect to this power. For while I agree on the merits 
that impeachment is a serious matter and should be used sparingly, I wonder 
whether there is a tipping point in certain cases of malfeasance—a point at which 
the decision to impeach could get taken out of Congress’s hands because of pub-
lic pressure, based on norms established by prior presidential impeachments, to 
punish egregious executive branch misbehavior. If so, this would turn congres-
sional power on its head, forcing Congress to use one of its most potent nonleg-
islative powers when it does not want to because of sticky historical precedents. 
Here is how this might play out with the investigation into President 
Trump’s Russia connections and potential obstruction of justice charges. Sup-
pose that concrete, smoking-gun evidence emerges demonstrating that mem-
bers of President Trump’s presidential campaign violated campaign ﬁnance laws 
or that President Trump himself obstructed justice by ﬁring FBI Director James 
Comey, for example. If clear evidence were to surface demonstrating that a crime 
had been committed by an executive branch official and that evidence were re-
ported widely in the media—perhaps even presented in televised testimony be-
fore the nation—the public might demand impeachment of the implicated offi-
cial. We no longer live in the Middle Ages when Parliament could draw trumped 
up charges against the Crown’s ministers and unveil them behind closed doors, 
away from public eyes and ears. The legislature no longer controls what infor-
mation the public can access; rather, the omnipresent media and the twenty-
four-hour news cycle ensure that congressional investigations and testimony are 
widely accessible and viewed. Indeed, we have seen the power of public pressure 
to compel impeachment proceedings before. After President Nixon ﬁred Archi-
bald Cox during the Saturday Night Massacre and after transcripts of his infa-
mous White House tapes were released, Congress faced signiﬁcant public pres-
sure to impeach the President. This public pressure was an important factor in 
forcing Congress to investigate and ultimately initiate impeachment proceedings 
against President Nixon.
141
 
 
141. The ﬁring of Archibald Cox was viewed by the public as a gross abuse of presidential power. 
Upon learning of it, citizens sent a record number of telegrams to the White House and Con-
gress in protest. See, e.g., Associated Press, Impeachment Mail Floods Congress, GADSDEN TIMES 
(Oct. 24, 1973), http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=hMofAAAAIBAJ&sjid=wdcEAAAA
IBAJ&dq=telegrams&pg=694%2C3954202 [http://perma.cc/7HQR-ZMWY] (“Sen. Barry 
Goldwater, R-Ariz., had 270 telegrams for impeachment and about a dozen against it with 
telephone calls more evenly divided in sentiment. Sen. John G. Tower, R[-]Tex., reported 275 
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Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, Watergate and the more recent impeachment of 
President Clinton—both of which involved obstruction of justice charges
142
—
may have established sticky precedents, or baselines, for what constitutes im-
peachable behavior and even for what necessitates impeachment of the President 
in the public’s view. If impeachment proceedings could be initiated against Pres-
ident Nixon for his efforts to cover up his aides’ involvement in the Watergate 
break-in and President Clinton could be impeached for lying about his sexual 
conduct in a deposition in a personal lawsuit,
143
 then it may follow inexorably 
that President Trump must be impeached if the evidence shows that he ob-
structed the FBI’s Russia investigation. And importantly, it may be the public, 
rather than Congress, who effectively pushes for impeachment. 
 
telegrams against Nixon, 16 for him; and Sen. Peter Dominick, R-Colo., more than 1,000 
telegrams with the ratio 100 to 1 against Nixon.”); McClatchy Newspapers Serv. & UPI, Record 
Numbers Jam Western Union, MODESTO BEE (Oct. 22, 1973), http://archive.is/20120718162705
/http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=KBIuAAAAIBAJ&sjid=jn8FAAAAIBAJ&pg=3099
,1866772&dq=western-union&hl=en [http://perma.cc/D66X-QHKQ] (“Western Union to-
day reported a record 71,000 telegrams received in its Washington office about the ﬁring [of] 
Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox in the ﬁrst 36 hours after his dismissal Saturday 
under President Nixon’s order.”). The transcripts of President Nixon’s taped conversations 
with his advisers also dominated news coverage and even the popular cultural landscape. See 
BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 145-46 (1976). 
142. See, e.g., WOODWARD & BERNSTEIN, supra note 141, at 252; Daniel H. Erskine, The Trial of 
Queen Caroline and the Impeachment of President Clinton: Law as a Weapon for Political Reform, 
7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008); Office of the Clerk, Final Vote Results for Roll 
Call 545, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES (Dec. 19, 1998), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998
/roll545.xml [http://perma.cc/XGQ8-MD7Y] (noting a ﬁnal vote of 221-212 on President 
Clinton’s obstruction charge). 
143. The attempted impeachment of President Clinton differed from the impeachment proceed-
ings initiated against President Nixon in that the latter led to the disgrace and resignation of 
President Nixon while the former ended in acquittal and even continued overall high approval 
ratings for President Clinton. See Presidential Approval Ratings — Bill Clinton, GALLUP NEWS, 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/116584/presidential-approval-ratings-bill-clinton.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/7UZB-G6ZQ]. But see David S. Broder & Richard Morin, American  
Voters See Two Very Different Bill Clintons, WASH. POST. (Aug. 23, 1998), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/voters082398.htm [http://
perma.cc/KE5Q-R2S2] (showing that President Clinton’s poll numbers regarding honesty, 
integrity and moral character declined after impeachment proceedings). Despite these differ-
ent political end results, the two impeachments taken together provide a strong precedent for 
holding Presidents to task when they obstruct justice. Perhaps more importantly, the charges 
that could lead to the impeachment of President Trump—obstructing investigations regard-
ing his political campaign’s connections to Russia during the 2016 election—are a far closer 
parallel to the obstruction of justice charges that roused the public’s ire and brought down 
Nixon’s Presidency than they are to the lying under oath charges that led to President Clinton’s 
impeachment. 
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On the other hand, it is also possible that, in this highly polarized and parti-
san era, President Trump could escape public censure even in the face of over-
whelming, concrete proof that he violated the law. Particularly because the media 
itself has become polarized and citizens tend to get their news from media 
sources that share their ideological outlook,
144
 the Nixon precedent may not 
hold, and the public may not call for impeachment even in the face of clear-cut 
evidence of presidential wrongdoing. Indeed, President Trump’s core supporters 
have remained remarkably loyal to him in the face of several episodes that likely 
would have undone politicians in the past, including the Access Hollywood tape 
and comments following the Charlottesville riots.
145
 That said, right-leaning 
media and some supporters might respond differently to evidence that President 
Trump colluded with a foreign state or obstructed justice than they did to the 
sexist and racist comments in the Access Hollywood and Charlottesville inci-
dents.
146
 
Conﬁrmation. Recall that Congress’s Constitution also calls for the rehabilita-
tion of Congress’s power vis-à-vis the other branches through congressional in-
sistence on Senate conﬁrmation of White House staff. This is an intriguing rec-
ommendation and a logical one in light of the history presented in the book. But 
again, once we move from the abstract to the concrete, attempts to extend Con-
gress’s conﬁrmation power to White House staff seem unlikely to gain traction. 
 
144. See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Deﬁnitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme 
Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 328 & nn. 110-14; Amy Mitchell et al., 
Covering President Trump in a Polarized Media Environment, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2017), 
http://www.journalism.org/2017/10/02/covering-president-trump-in-a-polarized-media 
-environment [http://perma.cc/4XLY-2Y8W] (reporting ﬁndings that during the early days 
of President Trump’s Administration, media outlets covered similar storylines but their as-
sessments of Trump’s actions differed based on political ideology). 
145. See, e.g., Meghan McCarthy, Republican Voters Remain Loyal to Trump in First National  
Poll After Video, MORNING CONSULT (Oct. 9, 2016), http://morningconsult.com/2016/10 
/09/republican-voters-remain-loyal-trump-ﬁrst-national-poll-video [http://perma.cc/JRT4 
-YVDB] (reporting that Trump retained support after the release of the Access Hollywood 
tape); Sabrina Tavernise, A Deal Breaker for Trump’s Supporters? Nope. Not this Time, Either, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/19/us/politics/trump 
-supporters.html [http://perma.cc/JDE5-M6NM] (reporting that sixty-seven percent of Re-
publicans said they approved of the President’s response to the violence in Charlottesville).  
146. But see Cameron Easley, Republicans Are Warming Up to Russia, Polls Show, MORNING CON-
SULT (May 24, 2017), http://morningconsult.com/2017/05/24/republicans-warming-russia 
-polls-show [http://perma.cc/KDC7-MWD2] (ﬁnding that forty-nine percent of Republi-
cans view Russia as an ally or as “friendly”); Views on the Russia Investigation, AP-NORC  
CTR. PUB. AFF. RES. (June 2017), http://apnorc.org/PDFs/June%20AP%20Poll_Russia/June
%202017%20Poll%20Fact%20Sheets_Russia.pdf [http://perma.cc/6QD4-5B46] (ﬁnding 
that only one in four Republicans views President Trump’s ﬁring of James Comey as an at-
tempt to impede the Russia investigation). 
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First and foremost, Congress’s failure to assert a power to conﬁrm White House 
staff over the past two hundred-plus years is a difficult precedent to overcome. 
The President would have every incentive to cast any congressional effort to as-
sert power in this context as an illegitimate interference with his right to hire the 
advisers he wants. Congress is likely to appear suspicious and power-hungry, or 
at least obstructionist, for suddenly inserting itself into this choice. Moreover, 
Presidents tend to appoint their White House staff at the outset of their presi-
dencies, when their approval ratings typically are high
147
—meaning that a con-
gressional attempt to assert this power would come at a time when the public is 
especially likely to side with the President in a battle with Congress. Second, 
partisanship is likely to play a role in Congress’s own willingness to pursue this 
application of its conﬁrmation power, as members of the President’s party are 
unlikely to want to tie his hands in choosing advisers. Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine legislators who belong to the President’s party viewing any institutional 
gain to Congress that comes from having a voice in the President’s choice of 
White House staff as sufficient to justify interfering with the discretion afforded 
to the de facto head of their party. 
There could be a ﬂip side here if, for example, an administration experiences 
serious problems or scandals involving White House staff and the scandals are 
of a kind that could have been avoided through the vetting that accompanies the 
conﬁrmation process. The Trump Presidency has already produced at least one 
such episode: the revelations surrounding former National Security Advisor Mi-
chael Flynn. Flynn was forced to resign after it came to light that he had lied 
about his communications with Russian officials in the months leading up to 
President Trump’s inauguration; and in December 2017, he pleaded guilty to ly-
ing to the FBI about these charges.
148
 The National Security Advisor post does 
 
147. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Moderation and Coherence in American Democracy, 99 CALIF. 
L. REV. 373, 388 (2011) (noting that most Presidents “enjoy broad support” at the outset of 
their presidencies); Nate Cohn, Trump’s Approval Ratings Are Down. How Much Does It Mean?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/upshot/trump-is-down-to
-38-approval-how-much-does-it-mean.html [http://perma.cc/UR77-Y8AX] (explaining 
that “[u]sually, presidents ride high at the start of their terms” and that the average approval 
rating for Presidents one month into their presidencies is around sixty percent). 
148. See, e.g., Derek Hawkins, Flynn Sets Record with Only 24 Days as National Security Adviser.  
The Average Tenure Is About 2.6 Years, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/14/ﬂynn-sets-record-with-only 
-24-days-as-nsc-chief-the-average-tenure-is-about-2-6-year [http://perma.cc/647X-P8SS]; 
Jonathan Landay, Pentagon Probes Trump’s Ex-Adviser Flynn over Foreign Payments, REUTERS  
(Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-ﬂynn/pentagon 
-probes-trumps-ex-adviser-ﬂynn-over-foreign-payments-idUSKBN17T26Q [http://perma
.cc/BQ8L-U9GT]; Greg Miller et al., National Security Adviser Flynn Discussed Sanctions with 
Russian Ambassador, Despite Denials, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www
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not require Senate conﬁrmation,
149
 and the vetting that accompanies Senate con-
ﬁrmation likely would have uncovered at least some of Flynn’s problematic be-
havior. The Trump Administration provides other possible candidates for scan-
dal as well, including President Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who serves 
as a senior adviser to President Trump and whose role has drawn criticism from 
many corners.
150
 Public support for Senate conﬁrmations of White House staff 
could grow if political scandals embroil more staff or President Trump pardons 
family members who have served as his unconﬁrmed close advisers to shield 
them from FBI or congressional investigations.
151
 But it would take an extraor-
dinary scandal, or series of scandals, to shift this norm. 
3. The Speech or Debate Power 
Chafetz also recommends that members of Congress reinvigorate their role 
as disseminators of information by leaking classiﬁed or other sensitive infor-
mation to the public when necessary to expose executive branch wrongdoing. 
Chafetz’s analysis regarding leaks of classiﬁed information is incredibly smart 
and thought-provoking. Indeed, I am largely persuaded that congressional re-
leases would be preferable to the leaks made by Manning and Snowden, as the 
 
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/national-security-adviser-ﬂynn-discussed 
-sanctions-with-russian-ambassador-despite-denials-officials-say/2017/02/09/f85b29d6 
-ee11-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html [http://perma.cc/N2G4-LDJY]; Michael D. Shear & 
Adam Goldman, Michael Flynn Pleads Guilty to Lying to the F.B.I. and Will Cooperate with Russia 
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/us/politics 
/michael-ﬂynn-guilty-russia-investigation.html [http://perma.cc/T6VG-SJW3]. 
149. See John P. Burke, The National Security Advisor and Staff, WHITE HOUSE TRANSITION  
PROJECT 2, 38 (2017), http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03
/WHTP2017-24-National-Security-Advisor.pdf [http://perma.cc/D48H-KGJK]; David A. 
Graham, How Did Michael Flynn Ever Get Hired as National Security Adviser?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 
10, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/ﬂynn-lobbying-disclosure
/519249 [http://perma.cc/6RMM-KDSW]. 
150. See, e.g., Jeet Heer, The Scary Power of Nepotism in Trump’s White House, NEW REPUBLIC  
Apr. 4, 2017), http://newrepublic.com/article/141835/scary-power-nepotism-trumps-white 
-house [http://perma.cc/VZB4-6BTG]. 
151. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Says He Has ‘Complete Power’ To Pardon, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 
2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-jeff-sessions.html 
[http://perma.cc/HBD4-TALB]; Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, If Trump Pardons, It Could Be 
a Crime, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/opinion/if-trump 
-pardons-crime-russia.html [http://perma.cc/V7RU-97GS]; cf. Ryan Lizza, Why Jared Kush-
ner Will Be Able To Keep His Security Clearance, NEW YORKER (July 18, 2017), http://www
.newyorker.com/news/ryan-lizza/why-jared-kushner-will-be-able-to-keep-his-security 
-clearance [http://perma.cc/HD94-PR7C] (noting that the White House, and not the FBI, 
has the ultimate say over security clearances). 
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calculus would be focused on what information the public really needs to know 
balanced against the costs to national security of revealing such information, ra-
ther than governed by one employee’s discomfort, or perhaps personal gripe, 
with the executive branch’s actions. That is, I am persuaded by Chafetz’s argu-
ment that members of Congress are on balance more likely to be attentive to 
what information should be redacted or omitted from a public dump than are 
ordinary citizens. 
But is a reassertion of a congressional power to leak one that the public would 
support? At ﬁrst blush, the idea seems too reckless and dangerous to win sup-
port, particularly in an era of global terror and heightened concerns about public 
safety. On further reﬂection, however, I have softened to Chafetz’s suggestion 
that this is a power that Congress can and should assert vigorously. One reason 
is that the executive branch should not be permitted to hide behind its own uni-
lateral conclusions and bald assertions that certain information is too sensitive 
for anyone else to possess, share, or even evaluate. Another is the recent partial 
leaks about intelligence community acquisitions and surveillance practices made 
by Senators Wyden and Udall in 2004 and 2011, which demonstrate that mem-
bers of Congress can be cautious and judicious in their leaks and can leak infor-
mation in a manner that ultimately beneﬁts and is supported by the public.
152
 
A third reason to support greater congressional exercise of the power to leak 
classiﬁed information relates to the problems raised by executive branch employ-
ees’ direct leaks to the press. Chafetz emphasizes the redaction and discretion 
issues posed by employee leaks, arguing that members of Congress would have 
been more discerning about what information they chose to leak and would have 
done so in a manner more careful and protective of state secrets than the dumps 
made by Snowden and Manning.
153
 In addition to such discretion-based con-
cerns, direct leaks by employees also create distraction problems. First, by re-
vealing classiﬁed information to the press, such employees violate the law, which 
means they either will be prosecuted and go to prison, as Manning did, or will 
ﬂee the country, as Snowden did.
154
 Either way, the leaker is then unavailable to 
 
152. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 220-22 (noting that Senators Wyden and Udall were hailed as 
“folk heroes” by some). 
153. See id. at 223. 
154. Another similar example is Thomas Drake, a former senior executive at the NSA who was 
prosecuted under the Espionage Act for leaking information about government surveillance 
activities. Drake maintained that he did not leak any information that was classiﬁed, and many 
regarded his prosecution as inappropriate. Drake’s prosecution shows that prosecution is in-
evitable, even when the leaked information may not have been classiﬁed, because the Justice 
Department feels compelled to prosecute in order to deter future leaks. See Jane Mayer, The 
Secret Sharer, NEW YORKER (May 23, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05
/23/the-secret-sharer [http://perma.cc/B65T-YP69] (noting that “top officials at the Justice 
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participate as effectively and as immediately in the debate generated by the 
leaked information regarding the appropriate scope of executive branch behav-
ior. Second, when the leaker is an ordinary citizen employee, rather than an 
elected official, his or her decision to leak and the propriety of the punishment 
meted out by the criminal justice system (or the leaker’s escape from punishment 
if he ﬂees) can itself become the subject of public debate, coloring the lens 
through which the leaked information and the executive branch’s actions are 
viewed. In contrast, when a member of Congress leaks classiﬁed information, 
the Speech or Debate Clause shields her from prosecution, enabling her to par-
ticipate in the conversation that follows concerning the executive branch behav-
ior revealed through the leaks. 
But even if one accepts Chafetz’s recommendation that Congress should be 
more active in leaking classiﬁed information that exposes executive branch mis-
behavior, the question remains whether the public is likely to accept such leaks 
from members of Congress. As Chafetz emphasizes throughout, Congress’s suc-
cess in rehabilitating any of its powers will depend on how “judiciously” its 
members behave in reasserting those powers.
155
 In the context of leaking classi-
ﬁed information, this means that members of Congress must be cautious and 
thoughtful in what they choose to leak the public—leaking only information that 
is necessary to expose real corruption or misbehavior by the executive branch, 
not information designed to produce partisan beneﬁt. If Congress limits itself in 
this manner, using leaks to reveal wrongdoing that the public perceives itself as 
having a right to know, and does so in a manner that does not seem to threaten 
public safety, then the public may well gain respect for it as an institution. The 
leaks made by Senators Wyden and Udall in 2004 and 2011 were exemplars of 
judiciousness—the Senators leaked only enough information to spur news in-
vestigations that uncovered executive branch misdeeds, and they did not indis-
criminately reveal sensitive information in a manner that threatened national 
safety. Moreover, the Senators who initiated the leaks were members of President 
Obama’s party, not opposition-party partisans seeking to score political points. 
If, by contrast, members of Congress were to leak classiﬁed information in an 
injudicious manner—e.g., using leaks to embarrass or undermine a President of 
the opposite party or leaking information that could harm counterterrorism ef-
forts—such leaks could backﬁre and cost Congress public support. 
 
Department describe such leak prosecutions as almost obligatory”); Ellen Nakashima, Prose-
cution of Ex-NSA Official Thomas Drake Was ‘Ill-Considered,’ Former Agency Spokesperson  
Says, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint 
-washington/post/prosecution-of-ex-nsa-official-thomas-drake-was-ill-considered-former 
-agency-spokesman-acknowledges/2012/03/12/gIQAXE6L7R_blog.html [http://perma.cc
/6583-K4GH]. 
155. See, e.g., CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 19, 24, 33. 
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In the end, the real obstacle to congressional use of leaks to check the execu-
tive may be Congress itself—i.e., whether it wants to take on the executive branch 
in this manner and whether it can remain nonpartisan in so doing. Some mem-
bers of Congress may be unwilling to embarrass a President of the same party 
(or an agency controlled by a President of the same party) by revealing sensitive 
information; others, conversely, might be tempted to leak information precisely 
in order to weaken a President of the opposing party. The Udall-Wyden leaks 
offer hope that such partisan considerations can be overcome, but partisan mo-
tivations remain a potential impediment to aggressive use of this congressional 
power. The next Section explores the party loyalty obstacle to rehabilitating con-
gressional power in greater detail. 
B. Partisanship 
As Chafetz notes, some scholars have argued that political parties are to 
blame for Congress’s self-disempowerment.
156
 The reasoning runs as follows: 
by rendering legislators more loyal to their parties than to Congress as an insti-
tution, political parties have interfered with the constitutional design—leading 
legislators to sacriﬁce institutional interests in favor of party interests—and have 
left Congress far weaker than it was designed to be.
157
 Although he acknowl-
edges this party-based account, Chafetz is not ultimately persuaded by it. In-
deed, he quickly counters the party-based account by arguing (1) that the prob-
lem of partisan concerns trumping institutional ones is true only during uniﬁed 
government, that truly uniﬁed government exists only when both houses of 
Congress, the Presidency, and the courts are controlled by the same party, and 
that such unity of control is rare; (2) that if and when truly uniﬁed government 
occurs, fewer checks by Congress are necessary or appropriate because the public 
has put its trust in one party to an unusual degree and this should translate into 
more leeway for that party to act; and (3) that there are actually many instances 
in which Congress has stood up to a President of the same party, despite party 
allegiances.
158
 Chafetz does not dismiss political parties as a factor in Congress’s 
loss of power, but he does resist the idea that their inﬂuence is inevitable or in-
surmountable. Indeed, one of the goals of Congress’s Constitution appears to be to 
reawaken Congress to the full array of power it has as an institution and to in-
spire it to behave in ways that are more institutional and less partisan. 
 
156. Id. at 28 (citing Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006)). 
157. See id. 
158. See id. at 28-30, 33-35. 
the yale law journal 127:880  2018 
924 
While I am sympathetic to Chafetz’s project to revive congressional power, I 
believe that his heavily historical approach to evaluating congressional power has 
led him to ignore—or at least to seriously underestimate—the ways in which 
partisanship may prevent Congress both from wanting to exercise its powers 
more robustly and from winning the public’s trust when it tries to do so. First, 
Chafetz’s rejoinder to party-based theories of diminished congressional power 
focuses on how Congress interacts with the other branches, but ignores how par-
tisanship affects Congress’s treatment of its own members during both divided 
and uniﬁed government. Second, Chafetz’s account misses the ways in which 
partisanship on the part of the voting public may inﬂuence the public’s perception 
of congressional action—perhaps leading those whose favored party is out of 
power to dismiss Congress’s reassertions of power automatically, irrespective of 
the merits of the underlying dispute with another branch. Third, some of the 
actions Chafetz urges Congress to take in order to enhance its institutional 
standing may appear partisan in ways that Chafetz fails to recognize and that 
may undermine their efficacy. 
Consider, ﬁrst, how Congress treats its own members. The power to conduct 
internal discipline and ethics investigations provides a good example of the role 
that partisanship has played, irrespective of uniﬁed or divided government, in 
Congress’s virtual abandonment of certain powers. Congress’s Constitution chron-
icles how Congress ceded the power to investigate its own members to the exec-
utive and the power to discipline members for ethics violations to the judiciary, 
and recommends that Congress reclaim these powers in the future in order to 
prove its integrity and improve its standing with the public.
159
 But as Chafetz 
acknowledges, internal congressional discipline long has been colored by party 
loyalty, with each party brushing off investigations of its own members and ea-
gerly investigating members of the opposing party.
160
 Ethics investigations, in 
particular, have a long history of partisanship.
161
 Republicans protect Republi-
cans and Democrats protect Democrats, no matter how bad the behavior at issue, 
and Democrats are willing to go after Republicans (and vice versa), for even mild 
behavior.
162
 Yet Chafetz nowhere explains how or why it is realistic to expect 
members of Congress to set aside their party loyalty to pursue investigations and 
discipline against their colleagues. Even if Chafetz is correct that uniﬁed, one-
 
159. See id. at 261-64. 
160. See id. at 241-44, 253. 
161. See, e.g., id. at 241-42, 253-54. 
162. See, e.g., Michael D. Cobb & Andrew J. Taylor, Paging Congressional Democrats: It Was the Im-
morality, Stupid, 47 PS: POL. SCI. & POL’Y 351, 354 (2014) (discussing evidence that Republicans 
sheltered Representative Mark Foley from investigation following a sex scandal involving 
pages while Democrats called for ethics investigation). 
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party government does not prevent Congress from serving as a check on other 
branches, partisanship has historically prevented Congress from acting as a ro-
bust check on its own members. 
Further, even beyond partisan concerns, there is little appetite in Congress 
for conducting ethics investigations at all—perhaps because members feel un-
comfortable investigating their friends or perhaps because those conducting the 
investigations fear that they could one day be subject to such investigations 
themselves.
163
 While innovations such as the creation of the House Office of 
Congressional Ethics (OCE) take some of the decision making power away from 
members of Congress and have the potential to force investigations when the 
evidence is strong enough,
164
 it is hardly encouraging that the ﬁrst act of the 
115th Congress was to attempt to abolish the Office.
165
 Indeed, that remarkable 
move illustrates just how far Congress must travel to even want to rehabilitate 
its internal discipline powers in the manner Chafetz recommends. 
Second, the country is more polarized today than ever before.
166
 It is at least 
possible that as a result, the public, like members of Congress themselves, may 
judge congressional reassertions of power in light of partisan considerations. For 
example, the voting public—perhaps persuaded by “fake news” or one-sided ac-
counts generated by partisan blogs—could evaluate the propriety of particular 
 
163. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 262. 
164. The House Ethics Committee is required to act on any recommendations it receives from OCE 
within forty-ﬁve days and must publicly release both its own actions and the OCE report and 
ﬁndings within that time period. See JACOB R. STRAUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40760, 
HOUSE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS: HISTORY, AUTHORITY, AND PROCEDURES 21 
(2015). 
165. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, With No Warning, House Republicans Vote To Gut an Independent Ethics 
Office, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/02/us/politics/with-no 
-warning-house-republicans-vote-to-hobble-independent-ethics-office.html [http://perma
.cc/PHF2-MBNF]; Jennifer Schutt, House GOP Moves To Curb Independent Ethics Office, ROLL 
CALL (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/house-gop-shoots-move-scrap 
-appropriations-committee [http://perma.cc/867N-W5KX]. 
166. See, e.g., Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Is Polarization a Myth?, 70 J. POL. 542, 554 
(2008) (“The American people, especially those that care about politics, have . . . become 
much more polarized in recent years.”); James A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Fed-
eralism, Political Parties, and the National Colonization of State Politics, 29 J.L. & POL. 1, 44 (2013) 
(observing that political parties and private lobbying have become more national over the past 
several decades, which he attributes to the nationalization of the media, and observing, “vot-
ers too have adopted an increasingly national orientation in their political attention and deci-
sion making”); Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public 
[http://perma.cc/TM29-72ZC] (showing an increase in polarization across a variety of met-
rics). 
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investigations through a partisan lens, supporting only investigations of the op-
posing party and viewing investigations of like-minded officials as witch hunts. 
That is, partisanship may have corrupted not only Congress, but the public as 
well, possibly affecting its receptiveness to trustworthy behavior by members of 
Congress. 
Third, some of the powers Chafetz urges Congress to rehabilitate may ap-
pear partisan in ways that Chafetz has failed to appreciate. And that will affect 
how the public as a whole perceives Congress’s actions, even if Chafetz is correct 
that party loyalty itself would not necessarily prevent Congress from asserting 
those powers. This perception can occur both in spite of and because of the in-
creasing partisanship of the public. Polarized voters may be especially primed to 
view reassertions of power by the other side as partisan, but even more moderate 
voters may ﬁnd these reassertions generally suspicious. Consider, for example, 
Congress’s power to punish contempt. Chafetz provides several historical exam-
ples of congressional sergeants at arms arresting contemnors during the early 
years of the republic.
167
 But it is difficult to imagine similar behavior by the mod-
ern Congress playing out well before the public. I think one cause of this—and 
perhaps one reason Congress ceded this power to the Justice Department, in-
cluding the FBI—is partisanship. Speciﬁcally, Congress may have been worried 
that a Democratic Congress’s arrest of executive officials serving a Republican 
administration or its search and seizure of documents held by a Republican ap-
pointee (or vice versa) would appear inherently partisan and therefore untrust-
worthy. There is, perhaps, something more impartial and valid about having 
such arrests and seizures conducted by unelected career FBI agents and their va-
lidity determined by the judiciary, rather than by Congress. 
Further, now that decades have passed since Congress last exercised its 
power to arrest contemnors, there also exists historical precedent supporting the 
exercise of these functions by the executive and judicial branches. If Congress 
were to suddenly start waving Congress’s Constitution or other historical sources 
in the air and asserting its long-dormant power to arrest executive branch offi-
cials or search and seize documents from the subjects of its investigations, the 
public would likely view this as a partisan spectacle created by Congress to em-
barrass the executive branch, rather than as a legitimate exercise of an established 
congressional power. This is particularly likely given how polarized the parties 
and the electorate have become and given the explosion of online news sources 
that enable people to get their information from only those with similar views. 
Finally, consider what would happen if Congress were to send its sergeants 
at arms to arrest a senior White House official, one who has a Secret Service 
 
167. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 171-79. 
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detail, and if that official were to resist arrest, questioning Congress’s authority. 
What then? Would the nation be treated to an armed standoff between congres-
sional and White House security?
168
 While this might make for great theater, it 
hardly seems like the kind of interbranch confrontation we should encourage. 
Moreover, if such a spectacle were caught on camera and replayed over and over 
by the omnipresent media, the public might view Congress as overstepping its 
authority and harassing the executive branch. 
A number of the other powers that Chafetz urges Congress to reassert or 
assert more vigorously raise similar partisan concerns. For example, Chafetz’s 
Speech or Debate Clause-inspired recommendation that members of Congress 
leak classiﬁed information to the public—which I support—could be viewed as 
partisan gamesmanship if a member of the party that does not control the Pres-
idency leaks the information. Likewise, a congressional decision to zero out ex-
ecutive officials’ salaries could be viewed as mere partisan retaliation if Congress 
and the executive branch are controlled by different parties—and that is inde-
pendent of the sticky-precedents problems outlined in the previous Section. Ef-
forts to make the White House staff subject to Senate conﬁrmation similarly 
could be considered inappropriate partisan interference or even obstructionism 
if the Senate and Presidency are controlled by opposing parties. Conversely, as 
noted in the previous Section, it is difficult to envision a Congress controlled by 
the same party as the President exercising any of these recommended powers ab-
sent a serious (and historically rare) rift with the President. 
On a slightly different note, Chafetz also suggests that Congress could force 
compliance with its contempt and subpoena powers by issuing public censures, 
defunding programs, refusing to conﬁrm nominees, or refusing to pass pro-
posed legislation. In other words, he suggests that Congress refuse to take any 
other legislative action until its requests for information are honored.
169
 History 
is on Chafetz’s side in that Parliament and the colonial assemblies once engaged 
in similar behavior.
170
 But this history feels rather ancient, and Chafetz’s call to 
resurrect it seems more nostalgic than realistic. Parliament, the colonial assem-
blies, and earlier Congresses all were more petulant than recent Congresses—
even descending into physical altercations on the House and Senate ﬂoor
171
—
 
168. I thank Kate Shaw for highlighting this possibility. 
169. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 198. 
170. See id. at 159-60 (describing the House of Lords’ refusal to conduct other business until King 
Charles answered its inquiry concerning the imprisonment of the Earl of Arundel); id. at 168-
69 (discussing the South Carolina House of Commons’ resolution not to “enter into any fur-
ther business” with the Governor until he recognized the House’s exclusive power to deter-
mine the validity of its own members’ elections). 
171. See id. at 54, 153-54, 244-45. 
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and they operated in an era when less action was expected of Congress.
172
 Mod-
ern Congresses, by contrast, have been excoriated merely for refusing to pass a 
debt limit increase
173
—that is, for exercising their judgment about whether more 
borrowing is appropriate—a milder form of confrontation than holding legisla-
tion or nominations hostage because the executive branch has not turned over 
documents in an unrelated investigation. Today, it seems likely that a Congress 
that refuses to legislate, approve nominations, or take other actions until and 
unless the executive branch complies with its subpoena requests would be 
viewed by the public as behaving in a petty, partisan, and obstructionist manner. 
This perception likely would be ampliﬁed by the increasing polarization of the 
public itself, with half the country primed to view this kind of obstructionism as 
partisan. Thus, some of Chafetz’s recommendations may create public percep-
tion problems for Congress because the modern public wants more legislative 
action from Congress, not clever threats, negotiations, and reassertions of power 
that further gum up the legislative works. 
C. Congressional Shortsightedness 
Toward the end of Congress’s Constitution, Chafetz comments that he has tried 
to show, through “detailed developmental accounts,” that “Congress has a pow-
erful suite of tools at its disposal” and that, if “used judiciously—which is to say, 
with real sensitivity to the surrounding politics—they can not only be effective 
in getting Congress what it wants in the moment, they can also increase con-
gressional power vis-à-vis the other branches in the long run.”
174
 I part company 
with Chafetz here because, in my view, the present-day Congress has proved 
itself incredibly shortsighted, focused on the immediate political moment, and 
relatively uninterested in its own long-term institutional legacy. In other words, 
I fear that today’s Congress may be incapable of looking past what it wants in 
the moment in order to achieve an “increase” in institutional power vis-à-vis the 
other branches and that it will instead always be so focused on the immediate 
 
172. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 110, at 55-56 (explaining that the Founders’ conception 
of the legislative process was that few laws should be enacted, whereas in the post-New Deal 
regulatory state, widespread governmental regulation and lawmaking are expected). 
173. See, e.g., Dan Balz & Scott Clement, Poll: Major Damage to GOP After Shutdown, and Broad 
Dissatisfaction with Government, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/poll-major-damage-to-gop-after-shutdown-and-broad-dissatisfaction-with 
-government/2013/10/21/dae5c062-3a84-11e3-b7ba-503fb5822c3e_story.html [http://perma
.cc/YRJ3-VJH5]. 
174. CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 302. 
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political moment that it cannot act in the ways Congress’s Constitution recom-
mends. In short, a third obstacle to the rehabilitation of Congress’s powers may 
be Congress’s own shortsightedness. 
I say this despite sympathizing with, and admiring, Chafetz’s idealistic vision 
of Congress. In theory, I too want to see Congress embrace its glory days and 
rehabilitate powers it has ceded to the judiciary and the executive. But I question 
whether Congress cares enough about its institutional legacy or is farsighted 
enough to do so. Indeed, two recent events suggest that the present-day Con-
gress has changed from the idealistic institution it was at the Founding to one 
that is opportunistic and cavalier about its own history and precedents. 
The ﬁrst stark illustration of Congress’s inability to put long-term institu-
tional concerns ahead of short-term political ones—or even to take into account 
how the public will view its actions—was congressional Republicans’ tone deaf-
ness in seeking to eliminate OCE as the ﬁrst act of the 115th Congress, discussed 
above.
175
 The public uproar that followed this attempt suggests that Chafetz is 
correct, in principle, that Congress’s power to investigate and discipline its own 
members is one that is closely linked to public trust.
176
 But Congress’s self-inter-
ested action also demonstrates that there is a wide gap between how Congress 
theoretically or ideally should behave and how Congress in practice is inclined 
to behave. 
A second example of congressional shortsightedness from recent history is 
Congress’s treatment and criticism of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
during the 115th Congress’s recent effort to repeal the Affordable Care Act. As 
Congress’s Constitution notes, CBO was created to empower Congress vis-à-vis 
the President.
177
 Indeed, CBO was established as part of the 1974 Congressional 
Budget Act, which strengthened Congress’s budget authority in direct response 
to budget clashes between Congress and President Nixon,
178
 and is designed to 
 
175. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text. 
176. See, e.g., Katie Leslie & Jamie Lovegrove, Pressured by Trump and Public Outcry, House GOP 
Retreats from Effort To Weaken Ethics Board, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www
.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2017/01/03/trumps-twitter-rebuff-republicans-drop-effort 
-weaken-congressional-ethics-board [http://perma.cc/9S3U-EK6K]; Eric Lipton & Matt 
Flegenheimer, House Republicans, Under Fire, Back Down on Gutting Ethics Office, N.Y.  
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/03/us/politics/trump-house-ethics 
-office.html [http://perma.cc/4L7F-NLB9] (“The day after House Republicans voted to 
eliminate an independent ethics body, members returned to work on Tuesday to ﬁnd their 
offices inundated with angry missives from constituents amid a national uproar.”). 
177. See CHAFETZ, supra note 1, at 63-64. 
178. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 
297 (codiﬁed as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688 (2012)). The primary motivating factor be-
hind the 1974 Act was President Nixon’s refusal to disburse funds appropriated by Congress 
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be Congress’s resource. Its function is to provide impartial economic estimates 
of legislation and serve as a counterweight to the Office of Management and 
Budget, which provides the President with budget estimates used in negotiations 
with Congress.
179
 Given the high stakes nature of the work that CBO does—
providing cost estimates and economic forecasts for nearly every piece of legis-
lation that Congress considers—CBO often ﬁnds its estimates questioned or crit-
icized by those who do not like the estimates’ policy implications.
180
 During 
Congress’s recent healthcare repeal efforts, however, CBO found itself attacked 
as an institution. The attacks did not come just from the executive branch, but 
from several members of Congress as well.
181
 It makes sense that the President 
would attack CBO, as CBO is designed to check and limit the President’s power. 
But for Congress itself to attack CBO is a classic case of putting short-term po-
litical expediency—in this case, the majority party’s dissatisfaction with CBO’s 
scoring of its proposed repeal of the Affordable Care Act—ahead of institutional 
concerns.
182
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how long is history's shadow? 
931 
Notably, for most of its history, CBO has worked closely with members of 
Congress during the legislative drafting process, with members of Congress and 
their staff often altering the language of proposed statutes to ensure that the 
budgetary impact of the statute falls in line with their policy goals.
183
 Following 
Congress’s recent efforts to repeal the ACA, however, some Republican legisla-
tors were so focused on their immediate political goals that they were willing to 
throw away this close working relationship with CBO. Members of the House 
Freedom Caucus, for example, offered two separate amendments to an appro-
priations bill that would have eliminated CBO’s Budget Analysis Division; one 
of the amendments would have required CBO to use data assimilated from four 
private think tanks rather than calculate its own budget estimates.
184
 This is a 
stunning act of legislative disempowerment based on a disagreement over one 
policy item and a move that emboldens the President at Congress’s expense. To 
be sure, only some members of Congress tried to strip CBO of its powers; others 
have continued to recognize CBO’s value and have cautioned against such at-
tacks.
185
 But the fact that the attacks went this far—including proposed legisla-
tion that would eliminate CBO’s budget-scoring function and greatly diminish 
its value as a resource to Congress—is signiﬁcant. Such attacks constitute pow-
erful evidence that some of Chafetz’s recommendations for how Congress should 
rehabilitate its underused powers may be doomed because the Congress of the 
twenty-ﬁrst century is more cavalier in its attitude towards its own power than 
were its predecessor legislatures. 
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Chafetz might counter that OCE and CBO are not inherent congressional 
powers and that Congress’s elimination or modiﬁcation of them to suit its politi-
cal needs is therefore appropriate rather than a sign of institutional weakness. 
But while they may not be powers in themselves, OCE and CBO are mechanisms 
that Congress created to enhance its existing powers or to improve its credibility 
and image—and CBO in particular was designed as a check against presidential 
power (speciﬁcally, presidential encroachment on the power of the purse). Thus, 
in my view, Congress’s willingness to dump or misuse these mechanisms 
demonstrates something troubling about its commitment to its own institu-
tional authority, history, and image. 
Congress’s institutional shortsightedness is, in part, connected to the parti-
sanship developments discussed in Section II.B. As Congress has grown more 
partisan and more polarized, it has become increasingly willing to abandon its 
own powers and institutional levers to achieve short-term political gains. In this 
respect, too, partisan interests have superseded the interests of the legislative 
branch as an institution. But there may be more than mere partisanship behind 
the modern Congress’s institutional shortsightedness. As the OCE episode 
demonstrates, there also seems to be a fundamental disconnect between mem-
bers of Congress and the American public. Congressional members appear not 
to have given any forethought to how their attempt to dismantle an ethics office 
would look to the voting public. Perhaps the problem is that members of Con-
gress no longer see themselves as a collective institution but, rather, as a collec-
tion of individuals or as a vehicle for their parties. The OCE episode at least sug-
gests that Congressional members have become more focused on their individual 
self-interests than on Congress’s institutional image or standing. 
*** 
This Part has disagreed with Chafetz about the extent to which some of Con-
gress’s underused or underappreciated powers remain open for contestation. 
Chafetz argues that the Constitution merely provides guidance, not deﬁnitive 
answers, to questions about political actors’ authority and contends that political 
institutions are involved in ongoing contestation not simply for policy outcomes, 
but also for the authority and powers to achieve those outcomes.
186
 I do not nec-
essarily disagree with him in theory. But in practice, this Part has suggested that 
modern political and historical developments may have moved the baseline of 
public and interbranch expectations with respect to some powers so much that 
Congress is unlikely to attempt—and the public is unlikely to accept—the reas-
sertion of long-dormant legislative powers. 
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Some, including Chafetz, might counter that if the baseline moved once to 
diminish congressional power, then it can move again to restore it. That is, con-
gressional contestation with the executive or judiciary in some new political con-
text can shift the balance of constitutional power. This Part has suggested that 
the likelihood of success in recapturing ceded congressional powers depends on 
the power at issue. Some powers are more open to renegotiation or aggressive 
congressional assertion than others. Speciﬁcally, where historical developments 
have created entrenched institutions or constituencies that would be harmed by 
Congress’s resurrection of old powers (e.g., the administrative state and the pro-
fessionalization of the civil service), or where Congress has ceded its power to 
another branch through a formal act (e.g., the debt limit statute), or where an-
other branch has seized congressional power and enshrined that power grab in 
a formal act (e.g., the judiciary’s seizure of the power to punish contempt and 
decide the scope of executive privilege), Congress may be unable to revive its old 
powers in the manner Chafetz advocates. This could be because another branch 
now automatically exercises at least part of Congress’s old power (e.g., the debt 
limit statute), because restoring Congress’s power would require repealing a 
statute or overturning a precedent and the executive or judiciary are unlikely to 
cooperate in such a reversal (e.g., the debt limit, the power to punish contempt 
and decide the scope of executive privilege), or because the public would view 
any attempt to reassert an old power as an illegitimate attempt to undermine 
established institutions, rights, or norms (e.g., the administrative state, profes-
sionalization, and judicial independence). 
Ultimately, it may be harder for Congress to take back power than it was for 
Congress to give up power in the ﬁrst place. We might call this the “scrambled 
eggs” problem. As the adage goes, once the eggs have been scrambled, they can-
not be unscrambled. Giving up power required either inaction by Congress or 
action by Congress and another branch together; it did not require Congress to 
step on other branches’ toes. Recapturing power, by contrast, requires congres-
sional action that would intrude on another branch’s authority and would upset 
settled norms, practices, and expectations—including, potentially, dismantling 
agencies and eliminating government jobs. This is far more difficult than the 
initial ceding of power because once institutional structures have been built and 
rights created (scrambling the eggs), those who beneﬁt from those structures 
and rights will ﬁght any efforts to reduce or eliminate them (unscrambling the 
eggs). Moreover, the impact of Congress’s actions on those people and programs 
will be highlighted in the media and may cause Congress to lose the battle for 
public support that ultimately determines who wins the contestation over con-
stitutional power. In addition, Congress itself may be reluctant to exercise its 
nonlegislative powers more aggressively, for reasons ranging from partisan loy-
alty to self-interest to short-term thinking. 
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Despite all of the above, it is possible that an extraordinary political event—
e.g., a controversial and self-serving decision by the President to ﬁre the special 
prosecutor or Attorney General or to pardon his family members or himself 
while FBI and congressional investigations are pending—could shock the public 
and members of Congress sufficiently and so signiﬁcantly exceed the bounds of 
political precedent that both Congress and the public could become willing to 
support renewed exercise of the legislature’s dormant powers to check the exec-
utive. That is, an extraordinary act of overreaching or misbehavior by one of the 
other branches could move the baseline of public expectations and support back 
toward Congress in a way that makes unscrambling the eggs more feasible. 
conclusion 
Congress’s Constitution is a rich, valuable guide to the origins of several con-
gressional powers, with many original and insightful applications to contempo-
rary politics. At its core, it argues that Congress is signiﬁcantly more powerful 
than most scholars and commentators have recognized. And it aims, through 
detailed historical accounts, to highlight Congress’s underappreciated powers, 
describe how Congress in some cases unwisely has ceded those powers to the 
other branches, and urge Congress to reclaim and reassert those powers more 
vigorously in the future. This Review has admired the ambition and scope of the 
book’s historical accounts and recommendations. But it has taken issue with 
Chafetz’s speciﬁc recommendations on three fronts. First, it has questioned 
whether some of Chafetz’s suggestions for how Congress should reestablish its 
powers are practically feasible in the modern era. It has argued, for example, that 
Congress’s own past practice in failing to assert certain powers—along with 
modern developments including the centralization of the budget process, adop-
tion of the debt limit statute, the growth of the administrative state, the evolu-
tion of the civil service and good government norms, and the expansion of the 
media—have established sticky precedents that might make it practically impos-
sible for Congress to rehabilitate powers it once exercised. Second, the Review 
has questioned whether Congress can reassert long-dormant powers without 
appearing abjectly partisan and, thereby, losing public support for its actions. 
Finally, the Review has suggested that Congress itself may pose the greatest ob-
stacle to reinvigoration of legislative power along the lines Chafetz suggests—as 
it may simply be incapable of looking past the political battles of the moment in 
order to focus on its own larger institutional interests. In short, while reinvigor-
ating Congress’s underappreciated powers may be a good idea in theory, in prac-
tice, it may prove signiﬁcantly more challenging than Chafetz recognizes. 
